Mr. Pederson, thank you for the conversation this afternoon. This email is a test to see if you can receive it. If so, just hit reply and then send it back.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
Fax (206) 227-1100.

Ron Wojnar, Manager
Darrell Pederson, Assistant Manager

Map of ANM-100 (59 KB)

Mission Statement for the Transport Airplane Directorate (ANM-100).

Downloadable Files

Type Certification Process (information located at FEDWORLD WWW Site)

FAA Order 8110.4()Type Certification Handbook
FAA Continued Airworthiness Index including AD's.
FAA Order 8110.42A, PARTS MANUFACTURER APPROVAL PROCEDURES, provides guidance in the approval process for compliance to the applicable requirements to obtain a Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA)

Designated Engineering Representatives Guidance (information located at FAA and FEDWORLD WWW Sites)

The DER Kit is a comprehensive set of Regulations,
Directives, and other guidance which the Designated Engineering Representatives (DER's) will use in the performance of their job. These documents are also available through the Department of Transportation and from the FAA's Aircraft Certification Offices. If you are in need of any other forms, instructions or other material not found here, please contact your controlling Aircraft Certification Office.


FAA Order 8130.24 - Procedures for the termination. nonrenewal of delegations

DER AC 183 - List of DER'S

FAA Designee Standardization Seminars

Advisory Circulars (ACs)

Advisory Circular Checklist

AC20-62D Eligibility, Quality, and Identification of Aeronautical Replacement Parts

Note: Many files on FedWorld are in .pdf format--download Acrobat reader here.

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not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Transportation or the Federal Aviation Administration.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 5, 1998 9:41:06 AM PDT
To: John_Dimtroff@admin.tc.faa.gov
Subject: Inspect cargo door wiring too.

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
1117 Longworth Bldg
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg
Washington, DC 20510-0303

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Robert Francis II
Vice Chairman
Bernard Loeb,  
Director of Aviation Safety  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas E. Haueter  
Chief, Major Investigations Division  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

John B. Drake  
Division Chief  
Aviation Engineering Division  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Al Dickinson,  
Lead Investigator, TWA 800  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Ron Schleede,  
Investigator, TWA 800  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

James F. Wildey II  
National Resource Specialist  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

David Mayer  
NTSB Wreckage Database Manager  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas McSweeny  
Director, Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA National Headquarters  
800 Independence Avenue, S.W  
Washington D.C 20591

Lyle Streeter  
FAA AAI  
Aircraft Accident Investigator  
FAA National Headquarters  
800 Independence Avenue, S.W  
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,  
Washington D.C 20591

Ron Wojnar,  
Manager  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate  
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Dear Mr. Dimtroff and Official Persons who feel responsibility in explaining TWA 800, 5 June 1998

There are cracked wires to the bare conductors in the cargo door area of TWA 800 as described by NTSB Systems Exhibit 9A, page 116:
"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." Page 47 also states, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.
That's a fact and NTSB told me so. To be prudent, determine if the forward cargo door unlatch motor power on wire is among those cracked to the bare wires located by NTSB in TWA 800. NTSB did it before with UAL 811 in AAR 92/02 where a bare chafed wire turned on the forward cargo door unlatch motor. There is a precedent of bare wires in that area causing a fatal accident in a high time Boeing 747. It would be prudent to rule out that event happening again by checking the bare wires discovered by NTSB in TWA 800 wreckage in cargo door area to see if it is the door unlatch motor wire.

True power always wants to know if it may be wrong and immediately take steps to confirm or rebut. True power knows error is weakness and will immediately correct the error to become strong again. Fake power ignores any evidence of error. It is weak and will fail. NTSB discovers the cause and makes recommendations to FAA. FAA orders the manufacturer to fix the problem. The problem is old cracked wiring. I come to elected officials, NTSB, and FAA officials because only you have to power to persuade the manufacturer to replace defective, old, and chafed wiring if necessary and it is necessary.

Very many, very red, and very large red paint smears exist on TWA 800 above the forward cargo door area on top of normal white paint in between the passenger windows. That's a fact and NTSB showed it to me by presenting the TWA 800 reconstruction photograph in which the many, large, red paint smears are clearly evident. <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html> A precedent has been set of paint transfer marks in that area by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02. <http://www.corazon.com/811page42paintondoor.html>
It would be prudent to confirm or rule out the red paint smears indicating an open cargo door in flight or not. One way would be to examine the cargo door hinge for overtravel impression damage, another precedent set by UAL 811 in NTSB in AAR 92/02. <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>

There is outward peeled skin high up on the right side of TWA 800, also more outward shattered skin on the belly, and most of all, there is outward peeled skin forward of the wing on the right side, centered around the outward petal shaped bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. That's a fact and I know that because NTSB presented the photograph of TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction and described the outward peeled skin in NTSB exhibits.

Main deck floor beams above the forward cargo hold were broken downward in UAL 811 during the explosive decompression. That also happened in TWA 800. An explanation was offered by Mr. James Wildey of NTSB: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The red paint smears and the outward peeled skin strongly indicate the forward cargo door opened in flight, an opinion shortly held by Mr. Fred Schalekamp of FAA:

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS: "The
paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

That's a fact and NTSB and FAA told me so in a letter and shown in sooting diagrams in exhibits. To not see the very red, very many, and very large unusual paint smears, and to not see the outward, not inward, peeled skin is to defy reality. The red smears, downward floor beams, and the outward skin are there and strongly indicate cargo door opened in flight based on physics and precedent.

The forward cargo door did open in flight, but not by the overpressure of a center tank explosion because the cargo door pieces were unsooted, just like the forward pieces of the center fuel tank.

What else could cause the forward cargo door to open in flight? There is a precedent, UAL 811, as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02 in which a high time Boeing 747 suffered a hull rupture in flight forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, and outward peeled skin, all caused by chafed to bare wire conductor in the cargo door area. <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>

TWA 800 had a hull rupture forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, outward peeled skin, and chafed to bare wire conductor discovered in cargo door area.

That is enough of a match to justify inspection of cargo door
wiring in early Boeing 747s irrespective of other corroborative evidence of faulty Poly-X wiring discovered in Boeing airliners under NTSB and FAA orders.

Bare shorted wires have also caused fires in forward cargo holds of Boeing 747s before.

NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46. "1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.
B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter."

It would be prudent to inspect cargo door wiring in the forward cargo hold of early 747s since that wiring has been shown to be faulty in general, early Boeing airliner wiring has been shown to be faulty in particular, UAL 811, and faulty cargo door area wiring has shown up in the same area on a new fatal accident, TWA 800.

A solution to the mystery of the ignition source of the fireball and center tank fire may well be a foded and on fire engine number 3 igniting disintegrating wing fuel tanks thousands of feet lower and seconds later than the initial event.

TWA 800 engine number three shows foreign object damage, fire, and uncontainment in the NTSB powerplant report and the structures report.

Exhibit 8A, page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades
with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward.

Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

A prudent action would be to rule in or rule out the precedent of UAL 811 applied to TWA 800. A risky action is to ignore many large red paint smears, downward broken floor beams, and much outward peeled skin and their clear implication of cargo door open in flight. The red paint smears will not fade away; they will always be many, large, and red in the photographs on the NTSB CD-ROM. The floorbeams will always be broken in Exhibit 18A. The outward peeled skin will always be shattered outward on the belly, the upper fuselage, and around the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in the photographs of TWA 800 on the NTSB CD-ROM. Engine number three will always be sooted, blades missing, and have soft body impacts as shown by NTSB Exhibit 8A.

A more prudent action is to ground all Boeing 747s with Poly-X
wiring for total inspections and replacement of that wiring. A total wiring inspection casts the net wider to catch faulty wiring. By inspecting all the wiring to include the fuel tank wiring, the yaw damper wiring, and the known previously faulty cargo door power wiring, all wiring can all be cleared as intact and pose no danger of shorting on, as has happened before fatally.

I understand the difficulty and turmoil the grounding would cause. Boeing would have much work to rewire the planes if necessary. If not feasible, new airliners would have to be built and the grounded ones used for parts, similar to what the Navy has done with their Poly-X F-14 Tomcats.

Am I a traitor? Does my belief of a wiring cargo door fault for TWA 800 and other early 747s hurt my country? Specifically, the Northwest quadrant which has an economy derived from the design, manufacture, and selling of 747s.

Here's my answer to myself on that one. No, I am not a traitor, I am a patriot. Here's why.

Seattle is successful and must remain so. Seattle is successful because nearby is built successful airplanes. Successful airplanes are the best selling ones. The best selling ones are the most made ones. The most made ones are the ones that make the most money. The ones that make the most money are the ones that fly the most. The ones that fly the most are the safest ones. The safest airplane is the most successful airplane. Period.

So, to present an explanation for an unsafe event, the crash of TWA 800, an early Boeing 747, is a good thing to do, even if proven wrong later. The goal is to makes safe airplanes which will fly the the most and be sold the most and be made the most,
thereby keeping our country's economy thriving.

My personal goal is to prevent death by preventing airplane crashes by preventing hull ruptures in flight on early 747s by preventing cracked bare wires shorting on the door unlatch motor thereby allowing the aft midspan latch to rupture and allow the middle of the forward cargo door to burst open causing a large explosive decompression which allows the 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off. This inner goal was determined by the selfless action of my pilot who saved my life in a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash years ago and which I have never forgotten.

It is the duty of aviation professionals to strive to explain TWA 800. And yet, this loyal citizen is rebuffed when presenting to NTSB derived evidence of a supplemental explanation to TWA 800. Why is that?

If I can't have a real conversation with NTSB or FAA officials regarding TWA 800, here is an imaginary one that sums up the past two years.

JBS: "Hello, NTSB, I'm answering your plea for public assistance regarding the cause of TWA 800."

NTSB: "What do you want?"

"I believe the initial event is moisture meeting chafed to bare wire and shorting on cargo door motor to unlatch position causing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight leading to thirty by forty foot hole of explosive decompression which allows 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off which leads to disintegrating aft fuselage, wings, and tail which ignite into fireball when fiery foddled engine number three meets
vaporizing fuel thousands of feet lower and seconds later."

"No."

"There are many similarities to an event that happened before, UAL 811, and TWA 800."

"You're crazy. Who are you?"

"Commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, 1000 PIC hours, Navy jet navigator, aircraft owner, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, avionics technician, and survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash talking about a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash."

"Go away."

"The evidence of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch support conclusion forward cargo door opened in flight, just like UAL 811."

"I'm ignoring you and will not respond to further comments."

"You are safety aviation officials who say you turn over every stone, who check out every explanation, who really want to know what happened to TWA 800, regardless of cause. Listen to me; talk to me."

"You are a wacky guy on the internet, you are bothering the real investigators and getting in the way, you have been told over and over again in great detail that you are wrong and we are right, you don't have your basic facts straight about the door, you should check with us before you say your nonsense to others, and
you are a flake and we don't like you."

"Maybe, but so what? The messenger's style is independent of the truth of his content. Moisture and shorted wiring caused the crash of TWA 800. Why do you not ask questions to me, as real investigators do, as I ask you?"

"We don't ask questions of citizens that we don't already know the answers to, we just make statements such as this: No, you're wrong, you're crazy, go away, we will not respond, goodbye, and thank you your for your interest in aviation safety."

Below is real:
10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS : "We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS : "Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS : "We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Summarized conversation between me and ordinary citizens who visit my web site:

Visitor: "What does NTSB and FAA say when you tell them about wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800?"
JBS: "They write that all cargo doors were all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, they have told me that over and over again and they will not respond to any further inquiries from me."

"What do they say about the red paint smears?"

"They pretend they don't exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends they don't exist."

"What do they say about the outward peeled skin?"

"They say it was caused by inward water impact."

"What do they say about the petal outward bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door?"

"They pretend it does not exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends it doesn't exist."

"What do they say about the missing manual locking handle, the two overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, the torque tubes, the two pull-in hooks, the midspan latches, and the other eighty percent of forward cargo door skin?"

"They say they are unimportant."

"What do they say about the Orange Zone pieces, the possible mixup in cargo door sills, the unsooted pieces of center fuel tank, the thirty by forty foot shattered skin zone forward of the wing on the right side, the chafed to bare wire discovery in cargo door area, and the many significant matches to UAL 811?"
"Nothing. They say nothing. Well, actually they told me to go away, and stay away."

"Have you gone to your congressman?"

"Yes, Sam Farr, and he has asked many time to NTSB and FAA for information."

"What happened?"

"They wrote to him that the door was all latched, all locked, all intact at water impact, they have told me that many times, and thanked him for his interest in aviation safety."

"Did you contact any other elected politician?"

"Yes, Senator John McCain, jet plane crash survivor and Chairman of the Committed that oversees NTSB."

"What happened?"

"He reviewed my data and submitted it to his committee for review. He asked me to wait until the hearings. He asked the NTSB to meet with me to related my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800."

"What happened?"

"The Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation still has the matter under review, I waited until the hearings, I went to the hearings. The suggested meeting by Senator McCain between NTSB officials and me was refused by Chairman Hall of NTSB"
saying there was sufficient evidence to rule out the cargo door opening in flight, he has told me that many times in great detail and a meeting was not necessary."

"Have you tried the press?"

"Yes, I've had several radio and TV interviews. Some get airplay and some don't."

"Have you tried Boeing?"

"Yes, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas both contacted before the merger. The two safety officers were polite and referred me to NTSB. Boeing engineers referred me to the Public Relations office of Boeing. The Boeing Public Relations office referred me to the NTSB. NTSB told me to go away."

"Have you tried the internet?"

Yes, I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website which has been online since July, 1996 and visited about 70000 times, according to page counters."

"What are you doing now?"

"I'm continuing to write to appropriate officials presenting the evidence and trusting it will speak for itself. It's not going to go away."

"Have you tried calling them?"

"No, my wife and daughter were approached in my home by two armed federal agents within twenty four hours of me posting an
email to Senator McCain about Air Force One crashing. Calling on the telephone out of the blue would be much too aggressive. Prior to the Secret Service interrogation, phone calls usually ended up with the official shouting and hanging up. So now I continue to write non-threatening, polite, full of facts letters and emails."

"Are you saying government public safety aviation officials in writing refuse to adequately respond to your request for a meeting to discuss facts, evidence, documents, photos, which clearly indicate a forward cargo door opening in flight on TWA 800?"

"Yes."

"They will not call you, write to you, or respond to polite letters with sources listed?"

"Nope."

"Are these the same guys that say safety is priority number one, they will turn over every stone, never give up to get a full explanation, and respond to every public inquiry?"

"Yup."

"Who are you? A wacky guy on the 'net?"

"Maybe, although I use government AARs for sources, and I'm also a survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash, a commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, light aircraft owner, jet carrier navigator, avionics technician including radar operator, and a retired
military officer in a converted garage with a computer and a phone line."

"And you've tried for almost two years to meet face to face with the public officials involved with TWA 800?"

"Yes."

What happened?

"Nothing yet. But I'm still trying. It's only been two years for TWA 800. The investigation is open and active. The evidence is not changing or going away."

And I am still trying:

Real facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces of plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:
1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area
forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

I may not be alone: "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Regarding the Aviation Week and Space Technology article quoted above, the following is supplied: <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>

Monica Warnock  
Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

Dear Ms. Monica Warnock,

You wrote to me: You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your
website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

I replied>Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right."

Ms. Warnock, I now believe you to be wrong.

I'm putting the 10 March 97 Aviation Week and Space Technology article in dispute back up on my web site at www.corazon.com at one minute after midnight on 1 June 1998.

Here's why: The content is everything and the content of the article is very, very important. I agree with the content. AvWeek agrees with content. The public officials quoted in your article agree with the content. The content quotes a public NTSB official who says that the cause of TWA 800 may have been forward door popping open. It also said the streak seen before TWA 800 crash may have been reflection off the skin of aircraft. I agree with that. It is very important. Let us call it the door pop streak article.

Ms. Warnock, you have done your job well by searching the web for Avweek articles. You found one. You then followed orders and directed it be removed. It was removed. The problem is now above your level of authority. So I direct my comments to your boss: Mary Francis Koerner, the Manager of Bureaus.

Will you please see that this letter goes to her?

Dear Ms. Koerner, I am told several things:
1. Get the door pop streak article off my web site.
2. I should ask permission to put AvWeek articles on web site.
3. Permission will be denied.

I asked permission. It was denied. You were right.

You have done all you can do. The problem is now above your level of authority. I assume you would refer me to 'The Lawyers.' I direct my statements to the lawyers.

Will you please see that this letter goes to them?

Dear AvWeek lawyers:

Ah, copyright, don't you love it?

My name is John Barry Smith. I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website at www.corazon.com mainly devoted to high time Boeing 747 accidents in which the hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing. It contains mostly government scanned in aviation accident reports, AARs, and occasionally copyrighted material from media, such as yours.

Please note, let us stipulate:
1. My site is non profit. I have not made a penny on anything related to that website. In fact, much of my money has gone out, nothing has come in, a problem as my wife will attest.

2. It is research oriented with airplane crash related comments, investigations, reports, pictures, and text.

3. I give full and clear credit to the sources I quote. AvWeek was clearly stated as the author of the door pop streak 10 Mar 97 article in question. In fact, that is very important, that's why I quote clearly and give credit to Aviation Week by scanning in the
entire article instead of paraphrasing, which would be quicker to download but not have the authority of the best aviation magazine on the planet, Aviation Week and Space Technology. And I omitted the advertising on the pages, too.

Now for argument:

1. I stole nothing from you.
2. It's fair use.
3. I can publish that article without your permission if certain conditions are met, and are: Non profit, small parts used, and credit given.

"Fair use and implied licenses.
Fair use is a legal license to use others' work, whether they approve or not. It constitutes one of the most important, and least clear cut, limits to copyright. The basic problem is that words like "fair" or "reasonable" cannot be defined with the precision non-lawyers (or many law students) would like. Until 20 years ago, fair use did not appear in U.S. legislation, but it now occupies about half of the copyright statute. In the U.S., partial or limited reproduction of another's work may be permitted under this doctrine.
On the one hand, fair use offers an especially liberal defense to uses that advance public interests such as education or scholarship. On the other hand, it is unlikely to be available if one fails to credit the original artist or author. It is not apt to be available to those who profit or interfere with original artists' or authors' ability to derive income from their works."
" 1998 Franklin Pierce Law Center. All rights reserved." (I hope I have fair use to quote the above.)

I believe I advance the public interest in aviation safety, I credit
the original speaker, the reporter, and the magazine, and I do not profit from it. I have fair use.

Conclusion: It will take a Judge to order me to remove the 10 March 97 AvWeek article from my website after it is put back up on 1 June 1998 or to permit me to continue to post it.

So, Lawyers, the problem is above your level of authority. I turn my attention to the Managing Editor:

Will you please see that this letter goes to him?

Dear Managing Editor,

What's the beef? You and your reporter, David Fulghum, have done a fine piece of work. You have pinpointed the cause of a mystery crash now under current investigation, TWA 800. It was the door popping open in flight. The NTSB official you quoted was correct. The streak was the skin spinning away reflecting evening red orange sunlight to observers below. The official was correct and he was quoted correctly by your aviation reporter. The implications of the truth you printed are profound. The cause now leads to chafed wiring shorting on cargo door unlatch motor and allowing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door which opened in flight. Exactly as has happened before with UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. The 300 knot slipstream tore the nose off TWA 800 because the explosive decompression shatter zone was much bigger on TWA 800 than on UAL 811, as shown by NTSB reconstruction photo of TWA 800 wreckage.

I encourage you to do a follow up story on the wiring/cargo door explanation as described on the website in question,
www.corazon.com. Mr. Fulghum and Mr. McKenna are familiar with the details of TWA 800 and wiring cargo door explanation.

Attached:

1. Correspondence between AvWeek Ms. Warnock and me.

2. Three .jpgs of the images published on website of 10 March door pop streak article.

3. Recent email to Government officials regarding this matter. Please note accurate numbers and sources given.

So, I must publish your copyrighted material, the 10 March 97 article on my website at URL http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html on June 1, 1998.

I'm at email barry@corazon.com or 408 659 3552 or 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley, CA 93924.

I encourage discussion regarding this matter. It's a hot story even though almost two years old. Wiring is the main culprit, not the door, not the center tank. NSTB is in the right church but the wrong pew. Wiring is the problem and it's in places other than the fuel tank tubes. It's in the cargo door unlatching motor circuits.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 10:24:37 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Aviation Week
To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Your website "http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html" contains several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.

Aviation Week & Space Technology is covered by copyright law which states that permission must be granted before our material is used. Your website is in violation of this law. You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Sincerely,
Monica Warnock
Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology
monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
(202)383-2314
Dear Sir,

Your website "http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html" contains several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.

Dear Madam, 14 May 1998

A thousand pardons. I immediately request permission to reprint Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997 on my website, www.corazon.com. (Corazon is my wife's name.)

The reason I scanned in exact image instead of paraphrasing text was to be precise and show source, very important for a research paper.

Should my request be denied, I shall of course, immediately
comply with your request and remove the article from my web site.

AWST is a fine magazine and one which I have read diligently for over thirty years. I have watched AWST's web site mature as time goes on. http://awgnet.com/awgnews.htm is on my bookmarks list and I check it first thing every morning. I'm in your database of subscribers. Keep up the good work!

Regarding this life and death matter of a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash about which I have published a 1200 page website presenting my shorted wiring opening forward cargo door in flight explanation to the general public in a non profit effort:

1. You surely understand I can not alter my website just on an unsolicited email out of the blue from:

   Monica Warnock
   Washington Bureau
   Aviation Week & Space Technology
   monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
   (202)383-2314

   The absence of title indicates your request may be personal in nature and not official. Please confirm your official title which corresponds to your request that I delete an article from AWST from my site. You may be spoofing me and my asking for credentials is prudent and an established protocol.

2. Your response indicates an interest in the subject of TWA 800. Could you refer a reporter to me so I can present my wiring/cargo door explanation to him/her? I would appreciate the opinion of an aviation professional regarding my nine years of
amateur research into hull ruptures of hour high time Boeing 747s. Your reporter, David Fuhlgum, in the referenced article, was able to elicit important material from NTSB officials regarding TWA 800; the forward door may have popped open in flight, and the streak may have been pieces of the aircraft reflecting evening sun. I am able to amplify those observations by an anonymous NTSB 'second official' using NTSB documents and photographs. It's a good story and one worthy of AWST's interest. FAA, NSTB, and Boeing are all saying wiring in older Boeing airliners is fraying and shorting causing problems, and so am I, long before the officials came to the realization.

3. >or we will consider legal action.

Why, O why did you threaten me? Your first contact, out of the blue, and it contains a threat of 'legal action'. What does that mean? I don't think it means a good thing. It just sets a wrong tone. Is politeness gone from even presentations about a plane crash?

4. >Your website is in violation of this law.

Whoa! You are calling me a criminal? Just like that? I'm breaking the law? I'm a lawbreaker? This is very disturbing. Maybe that's the way AWST works with the big boys who only respond to threats, not to polite requests with explanation attached. I'm not a big boy. I'm a retired military officer working out of a converted garage in California. I don't like anybody telling me I'm breaking the law unless it's a policeman, judge, or jury. And I still don't like it, but I obey. I really can't tell my friends that I changed my cherished web site because of a strange unauthenticated email from some babe named Monica at McGraw-Hill, now can I? I
mean, am I a man or a mouse?

See, a threat always turns a pleasant conversation into stressful one. Squeek, squeek.

To review:


2. Please to show credentials, madam.

4. Refer reporter to me regarding a subject that you feel strongly enough to want to affect with correspondence, TWA 800.

5. Keep up the good work covering aviation subjects around the world.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 13:48:41 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: Request permission to present article on website.
Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of Aviation Week & Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She is the Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints & Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation Week on outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology does not allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than our own.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology; however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.
James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau:

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: Request permission to present article on website.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of Aviation Week & Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She is the Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints &
Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation Week on outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.

Dear Ms. Monica,

Thank you for your prompt reply. I am saddened by the denial to present the AWST article on my web site. I shall search through it and delete it. Do I need permission to post your email in its place to explain why the article was deleted? I should explain why the article was removed to squelch any conspiracy coverup nonsense that pervades this TWA 800 investigation.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology does not allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than our own.

So sad.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology; however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

As soon as I am finished with this upcoming TV interview about wiring/cargo door explanation, I will. The TV station is KOMO-TV, Channel 4, ABC, in Seattle Washington and the arrive within the hour. I'm preparing for it so am unable now to find page, delete, change links, upload it to server right now. But how long to I have? Is 48 hours OK?
My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

Protecting the magazine? Well, OK, if you say so. I feel that quoting AWST in a non profit website about aviation safety helps AWST, but what do I know.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 383-2332.

Thank you very much, ma'm, and I shall. I shall say you referred me, is that OK?

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Fine, can I put that on my website?

Let me get back to you on this. I will delete offending article and
then send you URL of the new page so you can confirm I have cleansed the dirty deed.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 14:47:54 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re[2]: Request permission to present article on website.
Mime-Version: 1.0

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to
place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now-
as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine
with us. The complete URL is
<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>
If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again,

thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology
To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Done
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Dear Ms. Warnock,

You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right.

http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html

is the URL which now has deleted article. Completed 6:57PM 14 May 97, nine hours after your request. The TV interview went swimmingly. In fact, the interviewer from KOMO TV ABC Seattle, asked that I send him an email of the article in question. He was interested to hear about your request.

I just want you to know that you have made an old man very very sad. I shall have to research the web, as is my wont, to find out for sure if the copyright laws exist to keep non profit websites from fairly using one article of a magazine to support an aviation safety hypothesis. I make no money from this site, on the contrary, it costs me money to keep it up. The site is 1200 pages deep with on one page assigned to article. The goal of the
website is aviation safety, a common goal with Aviation Week. The officials quoted on the article are public officials whose comments are public.

It seems to me that permission should not be necessary for me to put your article on my website as long as I give credit to the author and make no money from it.

It seems to me that when permission was requested to put the article on my website, permission should have been granted.

You said 'protect your magazine,' as motive for requesting I delete the article. Protection from whom? Me? Aviation Week needs protection from me? I am a retired guy working out of a converted garage with a computer and a modem. You have nothing to fear from me, we are on the same side, aviation safety.

Regardless, the excellent article by David Fulghum in the March 10, 1997 issue has been deleted at your request. Should it become apparent that I do have the fair right to use your article under conditions which I fulfill, then, pop! up it goes again. I shall let you know in advance so you may attempt to dissuade me if you wish. It just seems that a guy ought to be able to pull out old magazine articles to quote from when he's trying to persuade visitors of an aviation safety point. In case I'm wrong, and I'm never wrong, I have erred on the side of safety and complied with your request.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Mr. Smith,
I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now—as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine with us. The complete URL is <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>

If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again, thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON

Two New York Air National Guard pilots, with the best view of the crash of TWA Flight 800 last July, are disagreeing about what they saw immediately before destruction of the Boeing 747-131 jetliner.

One believes the airliner was struck by a fast-moving object coming from the east, while the other saw only a fiery trail from the west.

However, both believe a violent explosion ripped the aircraft apart, propelling some of its passengers high enough that they did not hit the water's surface until 3-4 min. after the initial explosion.
Maj. Frederick C. Meyer, pilot of an HH-60 helicopter from the ANG's 106th Rescue Wing, has just been freed from an FBI gag order preventing him from giving interviews about the 1996 disaster off Long Island, N.Y. The copilot, Capt. Christian Baur, remains under FBI restrictions not to speak about the accident. But two officials familiar with his testimony told Aviation Week & Space Technology in detail what he told investigators.

In the days immediately after the accident, before being ordered not to speak, Meyer discussed his initial impressions with news media (AW&ST July 29, 1996, p. 32). Last week, he chose Aviation Week as the first news organization to hear a detailed account of his recollections and his testimony to federal investigators.

Meyer and Baur were in one of the wing's two aircraft operating north of the crash site. The helicopter was operating over Long Island about 12 mi. north of the TWA crash site. Baur, the copilot, was at the controls practicing instrument approaches. The crew was awaiting darkness so they could begin training with night vision goggles.
The key point on which the two pilots disagree is whether a streak of light appeared from the opposite direction of the flight of TWA 800 (which was flying from west to east after takeoff from Kennedy Airport), a possible indication of an intercepting missile or some other object.

Meyer's attention was first called to the area of the sky where the accident occurred "by a streak of light moving from my right (west) to my left (east)," the same direction as the TWA flight, he said.

Baur's account differs on this point. According to the two officials who have heard both pilots' accounts, Baur, on the left side of the cockpit, saw a streak moving from left to right toward the approaching TWA aircraft before the initial explosion.

"Almost due south [of the helicopter], there was a hard white light, like burning pyrotechnics, in level flight," Baur told investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, FBI and a Federal anti-terrorist task force. "I was trying to figure out what it was. It was the wrong color for flares. It struck an object coming from the right and made it explode."
Baur's first impression was that there had been a midair collision, possibly between two light aircraft that tow banners along the beach.

"They had witnessed these aircraft come very close to each other at that time of day, and that's what they assumed," the second official said.

NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said.

Meyer could not actually see the aircraft, but only the streak, and he admits that Baur, a younger man, has better eyesight. Moreover, Meyer adds, "Whatever Chris saw on the left side I didn't see because he blocked my view." Baur disputes this, saying that the explosions and crash were virtually dead ahead of the aircraft.

The helicopter was executing a missed approach and was about halfway down Runway 24 at the Francis S. Gabreski International Airport at Westhampton Beach, N.Y. It had started a climbing left turn to the south when the
accident occurred. The Sun had not yet set and the sky was still bright.

According to Meyer, the streak was about 15-20 deg. above his line of sight and perhaps 15 deg. left of the aircraft's centerline.

"I don't know if it was a missile that struck the airliner," Meyer said.
"Nothing at that moment said 'missile' to me. I spent a number of years in Vietnam and had seen missiles fired, some of them at me. But, that was 25-year-old missile technology, which left smoke trails. I understand today that they are made with smokeless rocket fuel and don't leave trails. What I saw was a streak of light, not a smoke trail."

The streak of light that Meyer saw made a very shallow, gradually descending arc. He points out that he never saw the actual airframe of the TWA 747 within the streak or subsequent explosions or smoke trails. It was virtually identical to the trajectory of a meteor, with only a slight curve. But unlike a meteor, the streak was red-orange in color, he said.

Meyer observed the descending streak for 3-5 sec. Then there was what Meyer describes as a hard, very sudden, yellowish-white explosion that looked
identical to the detonation of an antiaircraft shell. He did not suggest an antiaircraft weapon was fired at TWA Flight 800, however.

"It left a cloud of smoke just like a flak explosion does," Meyer said. "One to two seconds later, there was a second, hard explosion almost pure white in color. The position of that explosion appeared to be slightly below and behind where one would have anticipated the streak of light to have gone. The trajectory at that point appeared to be slightly bent down and slowed."

A new detail in Meyer's story was that almost immediately there was a third explosion and fireball. Meyer doesn't remember if there was an explosion and fireball or if the third explosion turned into the fireball.

"That was a soft explosion unlike the first two," Meyer said. "It began as a tiny point and it grew very rapidly into a huge fireball four times the diameter of the Sun. I was dumbstruck."

Baur also saw three explosions. But he contends that they started from left (east) and went to right (west). He said the explosions created a "huge waterfall of flame that cascaded down," the first official said. "The column
of flame was being whipped around violently. First it was
tumbling, and
then it refined itself into a spiral. The explosions were all before
the
cascade of flame began."

In the helicopter, Baur spoke first, asking if it was pyrotechnics.
ANG
operations that night were to have included flares dropped by a
HC-130
transport aircraft. The crew then called the Gabreski tower.

"We said we'd observed a fireball south of the field and we would
like
clearance to the beach to investigate," Meyer said. Baur actually
made the
call and reported a possible midair collision, the second official
involved
in the investigation said.

The crash time has been variously reported as being from 8:31 to
8:45 p.m.,
Meyer said. He believes the earlier time is more likely to be
correct
although he can't be sure.

Baur continued to fly the helicopter during the search while
Meyer functioned
as copilot and primary communicator. As they approached the
crash site, after
about 4 min. of flight, debris was still falling so they slowed to
avoid
being hit.
"As they got closer, within two or three miles, Baur could see the aircraft body, not tumbling, but in a vortex almost like inside a tornado," the second official said.

Meyer made another revelation that was the result of long reflection after the accident.

"I was looking ahead . . . as we approached the crash site," Meyer said. "I saw some debris at 1,200-1,300 ft. falling at terminal velocity and fuselage fragments tumbling at 40-50 mi. per hour. The things falling at high speed were bodies still strapped in their seats. That is logically inconsistent if they came from the same explosion at the same time. On reflection, I have concluded that the bodies must have been blown upward before they came down. That indicates a violent explosion."

On this point, the two pilots' accounts agree, the officials said.

"Debris was falling like snow," according to Baur's testimony. "Among the particulate there was metal and paper, some of it glowing. Through all of that, things would come racing through -- two or three high-speed objects
like sacks of potatoes. I believed them to be bodies that had been blown upward."

The pilots' opinion differ from the conclusion of inspectors that all the passengers were in the fuselage when it ripped apart from aerodynamic forces.

In an attempt to debunk the most egregious coverup and conspiracy theories, Meyer and other ANG officials remain adamant that their unit was not part of any larger, undisclosed, multiservice operation. Operations the night of the crash were standard training flights to maintain currency with night vision goggles, rescue operations and in-air refueling.

The HH-60 flight was to be of about two hours' duration and would not extend more than 2 mi. off the Long Island southern coast. The HC-130 would drop flares, rafts and a para-rescueman and later refuel the helicopter in a communications-out, lights-out operation.

"No other people of other services were on the base at the time," Meyer said. Nor were there indications of the operations of drone aircraft, another theory that has surfaced as the possible cause of the crash. "No, there would have been some kind of notice."
AW&ST 3/10/97

Until the streak is adequately explained, the missile explanation will always be possible. I say missile explanation will always be could be, but wasn't. The evidence refutes every missile explanation suggested event. Likewise for meteor and bomb explanations, they will always be could have been, but weren't.

The center tank did catch fire and there was a fireball, so center tank explanation will always be could have been and was, the only issue is when.

The wiring/cargo door explanation explains the streak, refutes the bomb and meteor, and supplements the center tank explanation.

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is the more correct, more complete explanation.

I urge that Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring be grounded until wiring is checked in cargo door areas known to have been faulty in the past.

I again request to meet with NTSB officials to present my wiring/cargo door explanation.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com
Citizen: USA
Major: US Army Retired
Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.
Navigator: RA5C Vigilante
Owner: Mooney M20C
Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 5, 1998 3:51:39 PM PDT
To: John.Dimtroff@admin.tc.faa.gov
Subject: Inspect cargo door wiring too.

Dear John,

Did this get through OK?

Cheers
Barry

To: John_Dimtroff@admin.tc.faa.gov
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Inspect cargo door wiring too.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
1117 Longworth Bldg  
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg  
Washington, DC 20510-0303

James Hall  
Chairman,  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Robert Francis II  
Vice Chairman  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Bernard Loeb,  
Director of Aviation Safety  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas E. Haueter
Chief, Major Investigations Division  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

John B. Drake  
Division Chief  
Aviation Engineering Division  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Al Dickinson,  
Lead Investigator, TWA 800  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Ron Schleede,  
Investigator, TWA 800  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

James F. Wildey II  
National Resource Specialist  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

David Mayer  
NTSB Wreckage Database Manager  
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas McSweeny
Director, Aircraft Certification Service
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Washington D.C 20591

Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI
Aircraft Accident Investigator
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591

Ron Wojnar,
Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Neil Schalekamp
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety Branch
Transport Standards Staff
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,
Dear Mr. Dimtroff and Official Persons who feel responsibility in explaining TWA 800, 5 June 1998

There are cracked wires to the bare conductors in the cargo door area of TWA 800 as described by NTSB Systems Exhibit 9A, page 116:
"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." Page 47 also states, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

That's a fact and NTSB told me so. To be prudent, determine if the forward cargo door unlatch motor power on wire is among those cracked to the bare wires located by NTSB in TWA 800. NTSB did it before with UAL 811 in AAR 92/02 where a bare chafed wire turned on the forward cargo door unlatch motor. There is a precedent of bare wires in that area causing a fatal accident in a high time Boeing 747. It would be prudent to rule out that event happening again by checking the bare wires discovered by NTSB in TWA 800 wreckage in cargo door area to see if it is the door unlatch motor wire.
True power always wants to know if it may be wrong and immediately take steps to confirm or rebut. True power knows error is weakness and will immediately correct the error to become strong again. Fake power ignores any evidence of error. It is weak and will fail. NTSB discovers the cause and makes recommendations to FAA. FAA orders the manufacturer to fix the problem. The problem is old cracked wiring. I come to elected officials, NTSB, and FAA officials because only you have to power to persuade the manufacturer to replace defective, old, and chafed wiring if necessary and it is necessary.

Very many, very red, and very large red paint smears exist on TWA 800 above the forward cargo door area on top of normal white paint in between the passenger windows. That's a fact and NTSB showed it to me by presenting the TWA 800 reconstruction photograph in which the many, large, red paint smears are clearly evident. <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html> A precedent has been set of paint transfer marks in that area by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02. <http://www.corazon.com/811page42paintondoor.html>

It would be prudent to confirm or rule out the red paint smears indicating an open cargo door in flight or not. One way would be to examine the cargo door hinge for overtravel impression damage, another precedent set by UAL 811 in NTSB in AAR 92/02. <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>

There is outward peeled skin high up on the right side of TWA 800, also more outward shattered skin on the belly, and most of all, there is outward peeled skin forward of the wing on the right side, centered around the outward petal shaped bulge at the aft
midspan latch of the forward cargo door. That's a fact and I know that because NTSB presented the photograph of TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction and described the outward peeled skin in NTSB exhibits.

Main deck floor beams above the forward cargo hold were broken downward in UAL 811 during the explosive decompression. That also happened in TWA 800. An explanation was offered by Mr. James Wildey of NTSB: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The red paint smears and the outward peeled skin strongly indicate the forward cargo door opened in flight, an opinion shortly held by Mr. Fred Schalekamp of FAA:

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS: "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

That's a fact and NTSB and FAA told me so in a letter and shown in sooting diagrams in exhibits. To not see the very red, very many, and very large unusual paint smears, and to not see the outward, not inward, peeled skin is to defy reality. The red smears, downward floor beams, and the outward skin are there and strongly indicate cargo door opened in flight based on physics and precedent.
The forward cargo door did open in flight, but not by the overpressure of a center tank explosion because the cargo door pieces were unsooted, just like the forward pieces of the center fuel tank.

What else could cause the forward cargo door to open in flight? There is a precedent, UAL 811, as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02 in which a high time Boeing 747 suffered a hull rupture in flight forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, and outward peeled skin, all caused by chafed to bare wire conductor in the cargo door area. <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>

TWA 800 had a hull rupture forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, outward peeled skin, and chafed to bare wire conductor discovered in cargo door area.

That is enough of a match to justify inspection of cargo door wiring in early Boeing 747s irrespective of other corroborative evidence of faulty Poly-X wiring discovered in Boeing airliners under NTSB and FAA orders.

Bare shorted wires have also caused fires in forward cargo holds of Boeing 747s before.

NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46. "1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found."
B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter."

It would be prudent to inspect cargo door wiring in the forward cargo hold of early 747s since that wiring has been shown to be faulty in general, early Boeing airliner wiring has been shown to be faulty in particular, UAL 811, and faulty cargo door area wiring has shown up in the same area on a new fatal accident, TWA 800.

A solution to the mystery of the ignition source of the fireball and center tank fire may well be a foddled and on fire engine number 3 igniting disintegrating wing fuel tanks thousands of feet lower and seconds later than the initial event.

TWA 800 engine number three shows foreign object damage, fire, and uncontainment in the NTSB powerplant report and the structures report.

Exhibit 8A, page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."
Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

A prudent action would be to rule in or rule out the precedent of UAL 811 applied to TWA 800. A risky action is to ignore many large red paint smears, downward broken floor beams, and much outward peeled skin and their clear implication of cargo door open in flight. The red paint smears will not fade away; they will always be many, large, and red in the photographs on the NTSB CD-ROM. The floorbeams will always be broken in Exhibit 18A. The outward peeled skin will always be shattered outward on the belly, the upper fuselage, and around the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in the photographs of TWA 800 on the NTSB CD-ROM. Engine number three will always be sooted, blades missing, and have soft body impacts as shown by NTSB Exhibit 8A.

A more prudent action is to ground all Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring for total inspections and replacement of that wiring. A total wiring inspection casts the net wider to catch faulty wiring. By inspecting all the wiring to include the fuel tank wiring, the yaw damper wiring, and the known previously faulty cargo door power wiring, all wiring can all be cleared as intact and pose no danger of shorting on, as has happened before fatally.

I understand the difficulty and turmoil the grounding would cause. Boeing would have much work to rewire the planes if necessary. If not feasible, new airliners would have to be built and the grounded ones used for parts, similar to what the Navy
has done with their Poly-X F-14 Tomcats.

Am I a traitor? Does my belief of a wiring cargo door fault for TWA 800 and other early 747s hurt my country? Specifically, the Northwest quadrant which has an economy derived from the design, manufacture, and selling of 747s.

Here's my answer to myself on that one. No, I am not a traitor, I am a patriot. Here's why.

Seattle is successful and must remain so. Seattle is successful because nearby is built successful airplanes. Successful airplanes are the best selling ones. The best selling ones are the most made ones. The most made ones are the ones that make the most money. The ones that make the most money are the ones that fly the most. The ones that fly the most are the safest ones. The safest airplane is the most successful airplane. Period.

So, to present an explanation for an unsafe event, the crash of TWA 800, an early Boeing 747, is a good thing to do, even if proven wrong later. The goal is to makes safe airplanes which will fly the the most and be sold the most and be made the most, thereby keeping our country's economy thriving.

My personal goal is to prevent death by preventing airplane crashes by preventing hull ruptures in flight on early 747s by preventing cracked bare wires shorting on the door unlatch motor thereby allowing the aft midspan latch to rupture and allow the middle of the forward cargo door to burst open causing a large explosive decompression which allows the 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off. This inner goal was determined by the selfless action of my pilot who saved my life in a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash years ago and which I have never forgotten.
It is the duty of aviation professionals to strive to explain TWA 800. And yet, this loyal citizen is rebuffed when presenting to NTSB derived evidence of a supplemental explanation to TWA 800. Why is that?

If I can't have a real conversation with NTSB or FAA officials regarding TWA 800, here is an imaginary one that sums up the past two years.

JBS: "Hello, NTSB, I'm answering your plea for public assistance regarding the cause of TWA 800."

NTSB: "What do you want?"

"I believe the initial event is moisture meeting chafed to bare wire and shorting on cargo door motor to un latch position causing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight leading to thirty by forty foot hole of explosive decompression which allows 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off which leads to disintegrating aft fuselage, wings, and tail which ignite into fireball when fiery furred engine number three meets vaporizing fuel thousands of feet lower and seconds later."

"No."

"There are many similarities to an event that happened before, UAL 811, and TWA 800."

"You're crazy. Who are you?"

"Commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, 1000 PIC hours, Navy jet navigator, aircraft owner, FAA Part 135 certificate"
holder, avionics technician, and survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash talking about a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash.

"Go away."

"The evidence of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch support conclusion forward cargo door opened in flight, just like UAL 811."

"I'm ignoring you and will not respond to further comments."

"You are safety aviation officials who say you turn over every stone, who check out every explanation, who really want to know what happened to TWA 800, regardless of cause. Listen to me; talk to me."

"You are a wacky guy on the internet, you are bothering the real investigators and getting in the way, you have been told over and over again in great detail that you are wrong and we are right, you don't have your basic facts straight about the door, you should check with us before you say your nonsense to others, and you are a flake and we don't like you."

"Maybe, but so what? The messenger's style is independent of the truth of his content. Moisture and shorted wiring caused the crash of TWA 800. Why do you not ask questions to me, as real investigators do, as I ask you?"

"We don't ask questions of citizens that we don't already know the answers to, we just make statements such as this: No, you're wrong, you're crazy, go away, we will not respond, goodbye, and thank you your for your interest in aviation safety."
Below is real:
10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :
"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :
"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS :
"We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Summarized conversation between me and ordinary citizens who visit my web site:

Visitor: "What does NTSB and FAA say when you tell them about wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800?"

JBS: "They write that all cargo doors were all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, they have told me that over and over again and they will not respond to any further inquiries from me."

"What do they say about the red paint smears?"

"They pretend they don't exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends they don't exist."
"What do they say about the outward peeled skin?"

"They say it was caused by inward water impact."

"What do they say about the petal outward bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door?"

"They pretend it does not exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends it doesn't exist."

"What do they say about the missing manual locking handle, the two overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, the torque tubes, the two pull-in hooks, the midspan latches, and the other eighty percent of forward cargo door skin?"

"They say they are unimportant."

"What do they say about the Orange Zone pieces, the possible mixup in cargo door sills, the unsooted pieces of center fuel tank, the thirty by forty foot shattered skin zone forward of the wing on the right side, the chafed to bare wire discovery in cargo door area, and the many significant matches to UAL 811?"

"Nothing. They say nothing. Well, actually they told me to go away, and stay away."

"Have you gone to your congressman?"

"Yes, Sam Farr, and he has asked many time to NTSB and FAA for information."

"What happened?"
"They wrote to him that the door was all latched, all locked, all intact at water impact, they have told me that many times, and thanked him for his interest in aviation safety."

"Did you contact any other elected politician?"

"Yes, Senator John McCain, jet plane crash survivor and Chairman of the Committed that oversees NTSB."

"What happened?"

"He reviewed my data and submitted it to his committee for review. He asked me to wait until the hearings. He asked the NTSB to meet with me to related my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800."

"What happened?"

"The Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation still has the matter under review, I waited until the hearings, I went to the hearings. The suggested meeting by Senator McCain between NTSB officials and me was refused by Chairman Hall of NTSB saying there was sufficient evidence to rule out the cargo door opening in flight, he has told me that many times in great detail and a meeting was not necessary."

"Have you tried the press?"

"Yes, I've had several radio and TV interviews. Some get airplay and some don't."

"Have you tried Boeing?"
"Yes, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas both contacted before the merger. The two safety officers were polite and referred me to NTSB. Boeing engineers referred me to the Public Relations office of Boeing. The Boeing Public Relations office referred me to the NTSB. NTSB told me to go away."

"Have you tried the internet?"

Yes, I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website which has been online since July, 1996 and visited about 70000 times, according to page counters."

"What are you doing now?"

"I'm continuing to write to appropriate officials presenting the evidence and trusting it will speak for itself. It's not going to go away."

"Have you tried calling them?"

"No, my wife and daughter were approached in my home by two armed federal agents within twenty four hours of me posting an email to Senator McCain about Air Force One crashing. Calling on the telephone out of the blue would be much too aggressive. Prior to the Secret Service interrogation, phone calls usually ended up with the official shouting and hanging up. So now I continue to write non-threatening, polite, full of facts letters and emails."

"Are you saying government public safety aviation officials in writing refuse to adequately respond to your request for a meeting to discuss facts, evidence, documents, photos, which clearly indicate a forward cargo door opening in flight on TWA
"Yes."

"They will not call you, write to you, or respond to polite letters with sources listed?"

"Nope."

"Are these the same guys that say safety is priority number one, they will turn over every stone, never give up to get a full explanation, and respond to every public inquiry?"

"Yup."

"Who are you? A wacky guy on the 'net?"

"Maybe, although I use government AARs for sources, and I'm also a survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash, a commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, light aircraft owner, jet carrier navigator, avionics technician including radar operator, and a retired military officer in a converted garage with a computer and a phone line."

"And you've tried for almost two years to meet face to face with the public officials involved with TWA 800?"

"Yes."

What happened?

"Nothing yet. But I'm still trying. It's only been two years for
TWA 800. The investigation is open and active. The evidence is not changing or going away."

And I am still trying:

Real facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:
1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit
water.

I may not be alone: "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Regarding the Aviation Week and Space Technology article quoted above, the following is supplied: <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>

Monica Warnock  
Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

Dear Ms. Monica Warnock,  
21 May 1998

You wrote to me:  
You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

I replied: Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right."

Ms. Warnock, I now believe you to be wrong.

I'm putting the 10 March 97 Aviation Week and Space Technology article in dispute back up on my web site at www.corazon.com at one minute after midnight on 1 June 1998.
Here's why: The content is everything and the content of the article is very, very important. I agree with the content. AvWeek agrees with content. The public officials quoted in your article agree with the content. The content quotes a public NTSB official who says that the cause of TWA 800 may have been forward door popping open. It also said the streak seen before TWA 800 crash may have been reflection off the skin of aircraft. I agree with that. It is very important. Let us call it the door pop streak article.

Ms. Warnock, you have done your job well by searching the web for Avweek articles. You found one. You then followed orders and directed it be removed. It was removed. The problem is now above your level of authority. So I direct my comments to your boss: Mary Francis Koerner, the Manager of Bureaus.

Will you please see that this letter goes to her?

Dear Ms. Koerner, I am told several things:
1. Get the door pop streak article off my web site.
2. I should ask permission to put AvWeek articles on web site.
3. Permission will be denied.

I asked permission. It was denied. You were right.

You have done all you can do. The problem is now above your level of authority. I assume you would refer me to 'The Lawyers.' I direct my statements to the lawyers.

Will you please see that this letter goes to them?

Dear AvWeek lawyers:
Ah, copyright, don't you love it?

My name is John Barry Smith. I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website at www.corazon.com mainly devoted to high time Boeing 747 accidents in which the hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing. It contains mostly government scanned in aviation accident reports, AARs, and occasionally copyrighted material from media, such as yours.

Please note, let us stipulate:
1. My site is non profit. I have not made a penny on anything related to that website. In fact, much of my money has gone out, nothing has come in, a problem as my wife will attest.

2. It is research oriented with airplane crash related comments, investigations, reports, pictures, and text.

3. I give full and clear credit to the sources I quote. AvWeek was clearly stated as the author of the door pop streak 10 Mar 97 article in question. In fact, that is very important, that's why I quote clearly and give credit to Aviation Week by scanning in the entire article instead of paraphrasing, which would be quicker to download but not have the authority of the best aviation magazine on the planet, Aviation Week and Space Technology. And I omitted the advertising on the pages, too.

Now for argument:

1. I stole nothing from you.
2. It's fair use.
3. I can publish that article without your permission if certain conditions are met, and are: Non profit, small parts used, and
credit given.

"Fair use and implied licenses. Fair use is a legal license to use others' work, whether they approve or not. It constitutes one of the most important, and least clear cut, limits to copyright. The basic problem is that words like "fair" or "reasonable" cannot be defined with the precision non-lawyers (or many law students) would like. Until 20 years ago, fair use did not appear in U.S. legislation, but it now occupies about half of the copyright statute. In the U.S., partial or limited reproduction of another's work may be permitted under this doctrine.

On the one hand, fair use offers an especially liberal defense to uses that advance public interests such as education or scholarship. On the other hand, it is unlikely to be available if one fails to credit the original artist or author. It is not apt to be available to those who profit or interfere with original artists' or authors' ability to derive income from their works.

" 1998 Franklin Pierce Law Center. All rights reserved." (I hope I have fair use to quote the above.)

I believe I advance the public interest in aviation safety, I credit the original speaker, the reporter, and the magazine, and I do not profit from it. I have fair use.

Conclusion: It will take a Judge to order me to remove the 10 March 97 AvWeek article from my website after it is put back up on 1 June 1998 or to permit me to continue to post it.

So, Lawyers, the problem is above your level of authority. I turn my attention to the Managing Editor:

Will you please see that this letter goes to him?
Dear Managing Editor,

What's the beef? You and your reporter, David Fulghum, have done a fine piece of work. You have pinpointed the cause of a mystery crash now under current investigation, TWA 800. It was the door popping open in flight. The NTSB official you quoted was correct. The streak was the skin spinning away reflecting evening red orange sunlight to observers below. The official was correct and he was quoted correctly by your aviation reporter. The implications of the truth you printed are profound. The cause now leads to chafed wiring shorting on cargo door unlatch motor and allowing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door which opened in flight. Exactly as has happened before with UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. The 300 knot slipstream tore the nose off TWA 800 because the explosive decompression shatter zone was much bigger on TWA 800 than on UAL 811, as shown by NTSB reconstruction photo of TWA 800 wreckage.

I encourage you to do a follow up story on the wiring/cargo door explanation as described on the website in question, www.corazon.com. Mr. Fulghum and Mr. McKenna are familiar with the details of TWA 800 and wiring cargo door explanation.

Attached:

1. Correspondence between AvWeek Ms. Warnock and me.

2. Three .jpgs of the images published on website of 10 March door pop streak article.

3. Recent email to Government officials regarding this matter.
Please note accurate numbers and sources given.

So, I must publish your copyrighted material, the 10 March 97 article on my website at URL http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html on June 1, 1998.

I'm at email barry@corazon.com or 408 659 3552 or 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley, CA 93924.

I encourage discussion regarding this matter. It's a hot story even though almost two years old. Wiring is the main culprit, not the door, not the center tank. NSTB is in the right church but the wrong pew. Wiring is the problem and it's in places other than the fuel tank tubes. It's in the cargo door unlatching motor circuits.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 10:24:37 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Aviation Week
Mime-Version: 1.0

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Our records
do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on
your website.

Aviation Week & Space Technology is covered by copyright law which
states that permission must be granted before our material is used.
Your website is in violation of this law. You must remove these
articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your
website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Sincerely,
Monica Warnock
Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology
monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
(202)383-2314

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Request permission to present article on website.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,
Your website "http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html" contains several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.

Dear Madam, 14 May 1998

A thousand pardons. I immediately request permission to reprint Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997 on my website, www.corazon.com. (Corazon is my wife's name.)

The reason I scanned in exact image instead of paraphrasing text was to be precise and show source, very important for a research paper.

Should my request be denied, I shall of course, immediately comply with your request and remove the article from my web site.

AWST is a fine magazine and one which I have read diligently for over thirty years. I have watched AWST's web site mature as time goes on. http://awgnet.com/awgnews.htm is on my bookmarks list and I check it first thing every morning. I'm in your database of subscribers. Keep up the good work!

Regarding this life and death matter of a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash about which I have published a 1200 page website
presenting my shorted wiring opening forward cargo door in flight explanation to the general public in a non profit effort:

1. You surely understand I can not alter my website just on an unsolicited email out of the blue from:

   Monica Warnock  
   Washington Bureau  
   Aviation Week & Space Technology  
   monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
   (202)383-2314

   The absence of title indicates your request may be personal in nature and not official. Please confirm your official title which corresponds to your request that I delete an article from AWST from my site. You may be spoofing me and my asking for credentials is prudent and an established protocol.

2. Your response indicates an interest in the subject of TWA 800. Could you refer a reporter to me so I can present my wiring/cargo door explanation to him/her? I would appreciate the opinion of an aviation professional regarding my nine years of amateur research into hull ruptures of hour high time Boeing 747s. Your reporter, David Fuhlgum, in the referenced article, was able to elicit important material from NTSB officials regarding TWA 800; the forward door may have popped open in flight, and the streak may have been pieces of the aircraft reflecting evening sun. I am able to amplify those observations by an anonymous NTSB 'second official' using NTSB documents and photographs. It's a good story and one worthy of AWST's interest. FAA, NSTB, and Boeing are all saying wiring in older Boeing airliners is fraying and shorting causing problems, and so am I, long before the officials came to the
realization.

3. >or we will consider legal action.

Why, O why did you threaten me? Your first contact, out of the blue, and it contains a threat of 'legal action'. What does that mean? I don't think it means a good thing. It just sets a wrong tone. Is politeness gone from even presentations about a plane crash?

4. >Your website is in violation of this law.

Whoa! You are calling me a criminal? Just like that? I'm breaking the law? I'm a lawbreaker? This is very disturbing. Maybe that's the way AWST works with the big boys who only respond to threats, not to polite requests with explanation attached. I'm not a big boy. I'm a retired military officer working out of a converted garage in California. I don't like anybody telling me I'm breaking the law unless it's a policeman, judge, or jury. And I still don't like it, but I obey. I really can't tell my friends that I changed my cherished web site because of a strange unauthenticated email from some babe named Monica at McGraw-Hill, now can I? I mean, am I a man or a mouse?

See, a threat always turns a pleasant conversation into stressful one. Squeek, squeek.

To review:

2. Please to show credentials, madam.

4. Refer reporter to me regarding a subject that you feel strongly enough to want to affect with correspondence, TWA 800.

5. Keep up the good work covering aviation subjects around the world.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 13:48:41 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: Request permission to present article on website.
Mime-Version: 1.0

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of Aviation Week & Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She is the Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints & Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation
Week on outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology does not allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than our own.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology; however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 383-2332.

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have.
about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: Request permission to present article on website.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of Aviation Week & Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She is the Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints & Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation Week on outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.

Dear Ms. Monica,

Thank you for your prompt reply. I am saddened by the denial to present the AWST article on my web site. I shall search through it and delete it. Do I need permission to post your email in its place to explain why the article was deleted? I should explain why the article was removed to squelch any conspiracy coverup
nonsense that pervades this TWA 800 investigation.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology does not allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than our own.

So sad.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology; however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

As soon as I am finished with this upcoming TV interview about wiring/cargo door explanation, I will. The TV station is KOMO-TV, Channel 4, ABC, in Seattle Washington and the arrive within the hour. I'm preparing for it so am unable now to find page, delete, change links, upload it to server right now. But how long to I have? Is 48 hours OK?

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

Protecting the magazine? Well, OK, if you say so. I feel that
quoting AWST in a non profit website about aviation safety helps AWST, but what do I know.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 383-2332.

Thank you very much, ma'm, and I shall. I shall say you referred me, is that OK?

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Fine, can I put that on my website?

Let me get back to you on this. I will delete offending article and then send you URL of the new page so you can confirm I have cleansed the dirty deed.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now— as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine with us. The complete URL is <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>

If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again, thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Done
Cc: 
Bcc: 
X-Attachments:

Dear Ms. Warnock,

You must remove these
articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right.

http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html

is the URL which now has deleted article. Completed 6:57PM 14 May 97, nine hours after your request. The TV interview went swimmingly. In fact, the interviewer from KOMO TV ABC Seattle, asked that I send him an email of the article in question. He was interested to hear about your request.

I just want you to know that you have made an old man very very sad. I shall have to research the web, as is my wont, to find out for sure if the copyright laws exist to keep non profit websites from fairly using one article of a magazine to support an aviation safety hypothesis. I make no money from this site, on the contrary, it costs me money to keep it up. The site is 1200 pages deep with on one page assigned to article. The goal of the website is aviation safety, a common goal with Aviation Week. The officials quoted on the article are public officials whose comments are public.

It seems to me that permission should not be necessary for me to put your article on my website as long as I give credit to the author and make no money from it.

It seems to me that when permission was requested to put the article on my website, permission should have been granted.
You said 'protect your magazine,' as motive for requesting I delete the article. Protection from whom? Me? Aviation Week needs protection from me? I am a retired guy working out of a converted garage with a computer and a modem. You have nothing to fear from me, we are on the same side, aviation safety.

Regardless, the excellent article by David Fulghum in the March 10, 1997 issue has been deleted at your request. Should it become apparent that I do have the fair right to use your article under conditions which I fulfill, then, pop! up it goes again. I shall let you know in advance so you may attempt to dissuade me if you wish. It just seems that a guy ought to be able to pull out old magazine articles to quote from when he's trying to persuade visitors of an aviation safety point. In case I'm wrong, and I'm never wrong, I have erred on the side of safety and complied with your request.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now- as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine with us. The complete URL is <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>
If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again, thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.
DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON

Two New York Air National Guard pilots, with the best view of the crash of TWA Flight 800 last July, are disagreeing about what they saw immediately before destruction of the Boeing 747-131 jetliner.

One believes the airliner was struck by a fast-moving object coming from the east, while the other saw only a fiery trail from the west.

However, both believe a violent explosion ripped the aircraft apart, propelling some of its passengers high enough that they did not hit the water's surface until 3-4 min. after the initial explosion.

Maj. Frederick C. Meyer, pilot of an HH-60 helicopter from the ANG's 106th Rescue Wing, has just been freed from an FBI gag order preventing him from giving interviews about the 1996 disaster off Long Island, N.Y.

The copilot, Capt. Christian Baur, remains under FBI restrictions not to speak about the accident. But two officials familiar with his testimony told Aviation Week &
Space Technology in detail what he told investigators.

In the days immediately after the accident, before being ordered not to speak, Meyer discussed his initial impressions with news media (AW&ST July 29, 1996, p. 32). Last week, he chose Aviation Week as the first news organization to hear a detailed account of his recollections and his testimony to federal investigators.

Meyer and Baur were in one of the wing's two aircraft operating north of the crash site. The helicopter was operating over Long Island about 12 mi. north of the TWA crash site. Baur, the copilot, was at the controls practicing instrument approaches. The crew was awaiting darkness so they could begin training with night vision goggles.

The key point on which the two pilots disagree is whether a streak of light appeared from the opposite direction of the flight of TWA 800 (which was flying from west to east after takeoff from Kennedy Airport), a possible indication of an intercepting missile or some other object.

Meyer's attention was first called to the area of the sky where the accident occurred "by a streak of light moving from my right (west) to my
left
(east)," the same direction as the TWA flight, he said.

Baur's account differs on this point. According to the two
officials who have
heard both pilots' accounts, Baur, on the left side of the cockpit,
saw a
streak moving from left to right toward the approaching TWA
aircraft before
the initial explosion.

"Almost due south [of the helicopter], there was a hard white
light, like
burning pyrotechnics, in level flight," Baur told investigators
from the
National Transportation Safety Board, FBI and a Federal anti-
terrorist task
force. "I was trying to figure out what it was. It was the wrong
color for
flares. It struck an object coming from the right and made it
explode."

Baur's first impression was that there had been a midair collision,
possibly
between two light aircraft that tow banners along the beach.

"They had witnessed these aircraft come very close to each other
at that time
of day, and that's what they assumed," the second official said.

NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks
the pilots
saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the
aircraft, tongues
of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft
popping open,
a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official
said.

Meyer could not actually see the aircraft, but only the streak, and
he admits
that Baur, a younger man, has better eyesight. Moreover, Meyer
adds,
"Whatever Chris saw on the left side I didn't see because he
blocked my
view." Baur disputes this, saying that the explosions and crash
were
virtually dead ahead of the aircraft.

The helicopter was executing a missed approach and was about
halfway down
Runway 24 at the Francis S. Gabreski International Airport at
Westhampton
Beach, N.Y. It had started a climbing left turn to the south when
the
accident occurred. The Sun had not yet set and the sky was still
bright.

According to Meyer, the streak was about 15-20 deg. above his
line of sight
and perhaps 15 deg. left of the aircraft's centerline.

"I don't know if it was a missile that struck the airliner," Meyer
said.
"Nothing at that moment said 'missile' to me. I spent a number of
years in
Vietnam and had seen missiles fired, some of them at me. But, that was 25-year-old missile technology, which left smoke trails. I understand today that they are made with smokeless rocket fuel and don't leave trails. What I saw was a streak of light, not a smoke trail."

The streak of light that Meyer saw made a very shallow, gradually descending arc. He points out that he never saw the actual airframe of the TWA 747 within the streak or subsequent explosions or smoke trails. It was virtually identical to the trajectory of a meteor, with only a slight curve. But unlike a meteor, the streak was red-orange in color, he said.

Meyer observed the descending streak for 3-5 sec. Then there was what Meyer describes as a hard, very sudden, yellowish-white explosion that looked identical to the detonation of an antiaircraft shell. He did not suggest an antiaircraft weapon was fired at TWA Flight 800, however.

"It left a cloud of smoke just like a flak explosion does," Meyer said. "One to two seconds later, there was a second, hard explosion almost pure white in color. The position of that explosion appeared to be slightly below and behind where one would have anticipated the streak of light to
have gone. The trajectory at that point appeared to be slightly bent down and slowed."

A new detail in Meyer's story was that almost immediately there was a third explosion and fireball. Meyer doesn't remember if there was an explosion and fireball or if the third explosion turned into the fireball.

"That was a soft explosion unlike the first two," Meyer said. "It began as a tiny point and it grew very rapidly into a huge fireball four times the diameter of the Sun. I was dumbstruck."

Baur also saw three explosions. But he contends that they started from left (east) and went to right (west). He said the explosions created a "huge waterfall of flame that cascaded down," the first official said. "The column of flame was being whipped around violently. First it was tumbling, and then it refined itself into a spiral. The explosions were all before the cascade of flame began."

In the helicopter, Baur spoke first, asking if it was pyrotechnics. ANG operations that night were to have included flares dropped by a HC-130 transport aircraft. The crew then called the Gabreski tower.
"We said we'd observed a fireball south of the field and we would like clearance to the beach to investigate," Meyer said. Baur actually made the call and reported a possible midair collision, the second official involved in the investigation said.

The crash time has been variously reported as being from 8:31 to 8:45 p.m., Meyer said. He believes the earlier time is more likely to be correct although he can't be sure.

Baur continued to fly the helicopter during the search while Meyer functioned as copilot and primary communicator. As they approached the crash site, after about 4 min. of flight, debris was still falling so they slowed to avoid being hit.

"As they got closer, within two or three miles, Baur could see the aircraft body, not tumbling, but in a vortex almost like inside a tornado," the second official said.

Meyer made another revelation that was the result of long reflection after the accident.
"I was looking ahead . . . as we approached the crash site," Meyer said. "I saw some debris at 1,200-1,300 ft. falling at terminal velocity and fuselage fragments tumbling at 40-50 mi. per hour. The things falling at high speed were bodies still strapped in their seats. That is logically inconsistent if they came from the same explosion at the same time. On reflection, I have concluded that the bodies must have been blown upward before they came down. That indicates a violent explosion."

On this point, the two pilots' accounts agree, the officials said.

"Debris was falling like snow," according to Baur's testimony. "Among the particulate there was metal and paper, some of it glowing. Through all of that, things would come racing through -- two or three high-speed objects like sacks of potatoes. I believed them to be bodies that had been blown upward."

The pilots' opinion differ from the conclusion of inspectors that all the passengers were in the fuselage when it ripped apart from aerodynamic forces.

In an attempt to debunk the most egregious coverup and conspiracy theories, Meyer and other ANG officials remain adamant that their unit
was not part of any larger, undisclosed, multiservice operation. Operations the night of the crash were standard training flights to maintain currency with night vision goggles, rescue operations and in-air refueling.

The HH-60 flight was to be of about two hours' duration and would not extend more than 2 mi. off the Long Island southern coast. The HC-130 would drop flares, rafts and a para-rescueman and later refuel the helicopter in a communications-out, lights-out operation.

"No other people of other services were on the base at the time," Meyer said. Nor were there indications of the operations of drone aircraft, another theory that has surfaced as the possible cause of the crash. "No, there would have been some kind of notice."

AW&ST 3/10/97

Until the streak is adequately explained, the missile explanation will always be possible. I say missile explanation will always be could be, but wasn't. The evidence refutes every missile explanation suggested event. Likewise for meteor and bomb explanations, they will always be could have been, but weren't.

The center tank did catch fire and there was a fireball, so center tank explanation will always be could have been and was, the
only issue is when.

The wiring/cargo door explanation explains the streak, refutes the bomb and meteor, and supplements the center tank explanation.

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is the more correct, more complete explanation.

I urge that Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring be grounded until wiring is checked in cargo door areas known to have been faulty in the past.

I again request to meet with NTSB officials to present my wiring/cargo door explanation.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com
Citizen: USA
Major: US Army Retired
Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.
Navigator: RA5C Vigilante
Owner: Mooney M20C
Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash.
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 5, 1998 8:38:34 PM PDT
To: John.Dimtroff@FAA.DOT.GOV
Subject: Check cargo door wiring too.

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
1117 Longworth Bldg
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg
Washington, DC 20510-0303

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Robert Francis II
Vice Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Bernard Loeb,
Director of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas E. Haueter
Chief, Major Investigations Division
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

John B. Drake
Division Chief
Aviation Engineering Division
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Al Dickinson,
Lead Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Ron Schleede,
Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594
James F. Wildey II  
National Resource Specialist  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

David Mayer  
NTSB Wreckage Database Manager  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas McSweeney  
Director, Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA National Headquarters  
800 Independence Avenue, S.W  
Washington D.C 20591

Lyle Streeter  
FAA AAI  
Aircraft Accident Investigator  
FAA National Headquarters  
800 Independence Avenue, S.W  
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,  
Washington D.C 20591

Ron Wojnar,  
Manager  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate  
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
Renton, WA 98055-4056
Neil Schalekamp  
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety  
Branch  
Transport Standards Staff  
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100  
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,  
Aerospace Engineer,  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100  
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Mr. Dimtroff and Official Persons who feel responsibility in explaining TWA 800,  
5 June 1998

There are cracked wires to the bare conductors in the cargo door area of TWA 800 as described by NTSB Systems Exhibit 9A, page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." Page 47 also states, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of
N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

That's a fact and NTSB told me so. To be prudent, determine if the forward cargo door unlatch motor power on wire is among those cracked to the bare wires located by NTSB in TWA 800. NTSB did it before with UAL 811 in AAR 92/02 where a bare chafed wire turned on the forward cargo door unlatch motor. There is a precedent of bare wires in that area causing a fatal accident in a high time Boeing 747. It would be prudent to rule out that event happening again by checking the bare wires discovered by NTSB in TWA 800 wreckage in cargo door area to see if it is the door unlatch motor wire.

True power always wants to know if it may be wrong and immediately take steps to confirm or rebut. True power knows error is weakness and will immediately correct the error to become strong again. Fake power ignores any evidence of error. It is weak and will fail. NTSB discovers the cause and makes recommendations to FAA. FAA orders the manufacturer to fix the problem. The problem is old cracked wiring. I come to elected
officials,
NTSB, and FAA officials because only you have to power to persuade the
manufacturer to replace defective, old, and chafed wiring if necessary and
it is necessary.

Very many, very red, and very large red paint smears exist on TWA 800 above
the forward cargo door area on top of normal white paint in between the
passenger windows. That's a fact and NTSB showed it to me by presenting the
TWA 800 reconstruction photograph in which the many, large, red paint
A precedent has been set of paint transfer marks in that area by UAL 811 as
described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02.
<http://www.corazon.com/811page42paintondoordoor.html>

It would be prudent to confirm or rule out the red paint smears indicating
an open cargo door in flight or not. One way would be to examine the cargo
door hinge for overtravel impression damage, another precedent set by UAL
811 in NTSB in AAR 92/02.
<http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>

There is outward peeled skin high up on the right side of TWA 800, also
more outward shattered skin on the belly, and most of all, there is outward peeled skin forward of the wing on the right side, centered around the outward petal shaped bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. That's a fact and I know that because NTSB presented the photograph of TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction and described the outward peeled skin in NTSB exhibits.

Main deck floor beams above the forward cargo hold were broken downward in UAL 811 during the explosive decompression. That also happened in TWA 800. An explanation was offered by Mr. James Wildey of NTSB: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The red paint smears and the outward peeled skin strongly indicate the forward cargo door opened in flight, an opinion shortly held by
Mr. Fred Schalekamp of FAA:

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS: "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

That's a fact and NTSB and FAA told me so in a letter and shown in sooting diagrams in exhibits. To not see the very red, very many, and very large unusual paint smears, and to not see the outward, not inward, peeled skin is to defy reality. The red smears, downward floor beams, and the outward skin are there and strongly indicate cargo door opened in flight based on physics and precedent.

The forward cargo door did open in flight, but not by the overpressure of a center tank explosion because the cargo door pieces were unsooted, just like the forward pieces of the center fuel tank.

What else could cause the forward cargo door to open in flight? There is a precedent, UAL 811, as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02 in which a high time Boeing 747 suffered a hull rupture in flight forward of the wing
which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, and outward peeled skin, all caused by chafed to bare wire conductor in the cargo door area. 

TWA 800 had a hull rupture forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, outward peeled skin, and chafed to bare wire conductor discovered in cargo door area.

That is enough of a match to justify inspection of cargo door wiring in early Boeing 747s irrespective of other corroborative evidence of faulty Poly-X wiring discovered in Boeing airliners under NTSB and FAA orders.

Bare shorted wires have also caused fires in forward cargo holds of Boeing 747s before.

NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46. "1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of
forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter."

It would be prudent to inspect cargo door wiring in the forward cargo hold of early 747s since that wiring has been shown to be faulty in general, early Boeing airliner wiring has been shown to be faulty in particular, UAL 811, and faulty cargo door area wiring has shown up in the same area on a new fatal accident, TWA 800.

A solution to the mystery of the ignition source of the fireball and center tank fire may well be a foddled and on fire engine number 3 igniting disintegrating wing fuel tanks thousands of feet lower and seconds later than the initial event.

TWA 800 engine number three shows foreign object damage, fire, and uncontainment in the NTSB powerplant report and the structures report.

Exhibit 8A, page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the
outer
midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan
blades had
impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of
the impact
damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the
midspan shroud
on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body
impacts
along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body
impact, which
had some streaking extending rearward."

Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1
Horizontal
Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer
are
sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and
glitter."
On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator
blade from
turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the
outboard
trailing edge.

A prudent action would be to rule in or rule out the precedent of
UAL 811
applied to TWA 800. A risky action is to ignore many large red
paint
smears, downward broken floor beams, and much outward
peeled skin and their
clear implication of cargo door open in flight. The red paint
smears will
not fade away; they will always be many, large, and red in the photographs on the NTSB CD-ROM. The floorbeams will always be broken in Exhibit 18A. The outward peeled skin will always be shattered outward on the belly, the upper fuselage, and around the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in the photographs of TWA 800 on the NTSB CD-ROM. Engine number three will always be sooted, blades missing, and have soft body impacts as shown by NTSB Exhibit 8A.

A more prudent action is to ground all Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring for total inspections and replacement of that wiring. A total wiring inspection casts the net wider to catch faulty wiring. By inspecting all the wiring to include the fuel tank wiring, the yaw damper wiring, and the known previously faulty cargo door power wiring, all wiring can all be cleared as intact and pose no danger of shorting on, as has happened before fatally.

I understand the difficulty and turmoil the grounding would cause. Boeing would have much work to rewire the planes if necessary. If not feasible, new airliners would have to be built and the grounded ones used for parts,
similar to what the Navy has done with their Poly-X F-14 Tomcats.

Am I a traitor? Does my belief of a wiring cargo door fault for TWA 800 and other early 747s hurt my country? Specifically, the Northwest quadrant which has an economy derived from the design, manufacture, and selling of 747s.

Here's my answer to myself on that one. No, I am not a traitor, I am a patriot. Here's why.

Seattle is successful and must remain so. Seattle is successful because nearby is built successful airplanes. Successful airplanes are the best selling ones. The best selling ones are the most made ones. The most made ones are the ones that make the most money. The ones that make the most money are the ones that fly the most. The ones that fly the most are the safest ones. The safest airplane is the most successful airplane. Period.

So, to present an explanation for an unsafe event, the crash of TWA 800, an early Boeing 747, is a good thing to do, even if proven wrong later. The goal is to makes safe airplanes which will fly the the most and be
sold the
most and be made the most, thereby keeping our country's
economy thriving.

My personal goal is to prevent death by preventing airplane
crashes by
preventing hull ruptures in flight on early 747s by preventing
cracked bare
wires shorting on the door unlatch motor thereby allowing the aft
midspan
latch to rupture and allow the middle of the forward cargo door
to burst
open causing a large explosive decompression which allows the
300 knot
slipstream to tear nose off. This inner goal was determined by the
selfless
action of my pilot who saved my life in a sudden night fiery fatal
jet
plane crash years ago and which I have never forgotten.

It is the duty of aviation professionals to strive to explain TWA
800. And
yet, this loyal citizen is rebuffed when presenting to NTSB
NTSB derived
evidence of a supplemental explanation to TWA 800. Why is
that?

If I can't have a real conversation with NTSB or FAA officials
regarding
TWA 800, here is an imaginary one that sums up the past two
years.

JBS: "Hello, NTSB, I'm answering your plea for public
assistance regarding
the cause of TWA 800."

NTSB: "What do you want?"

"I believe the initial event is moisture meeting chafed to bare
wire and
shorting on cargo door motor to unlatch position causing rupture
at aft
midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight leading to thirty by
forty
foot hole of explosive decompression which allows 300 knot
slipstream to
tear nose off which leads to disintegrating aft fuselage, wings,
and tail
which ignite into fireball when fiery fodied engine number three
meets
vaporizing fuel thousands of feet lower and seconds later."

"No."

"There are many similarities to an event that happened before,
UAL 811, and
TWA 800."

"You're crazy. Who are you?"

"Commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, 1000 PIC hours,
Navy jet
navigator, aircraft owner, FAA Part 135 certificate holder,
avionics
technician, and survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane
crash
talking about a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash."

"Go away."

"The evidence of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch support conclusion forward cargo door opened in flight, just like UAL 811."

"I'm ignoring you and will not respond to further comments."

"You are safety aviation officials who say you turn over every stone, who check out every explanation, who really want to know what happened to TWA 800, regardless of cause. Listen to me; talk to me."

"You are a wacky guy on the internet, you are bothering the real investigators and getting in the way, you have been told over and over again in great detail that you are wrong and we are right, you don't have your basic facts straight about the door, you should check with us before you say your nonsense to others, and you are a flake and we don't like you."

"Maybe, but so what? The messenger's style is independent of the truth of his content. Moisture and shorted wiring caused the crash of TWA 800. Why do you not ask questions to me, as real investigators do, as I ask"
you?"

"We don't ask questions of citizens that we don't already know the answers to, we just make statements such as this: No, your're wrong, you're crazy, go away, we will not respond, goodbye, and thank you your for your interest in aviation safety."

Below is real:
10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS:
"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS:
"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS:
"We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Summarized conversation between me and ordinary citizens who visit my web site:

Visitor: "What does NTSB and FAA say when you tell them
about wiring/cargo
door explanation for TWA 800?"

JBS: "They write that all cargo doors were all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, they have told me that over and over again and they will not respond to any further inquiries from me."

"What do they say about the red paint smears?"

"They pretend they don't exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends they don't exist."

"What do they say about the outward peeled skin?"

"They say it was caused by inward water impact."

"What do they say about the petal outward bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door?"

"They pretend it does not exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends it doesn't exist."

"What do they say about the missing manual locking handle, the two overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, the torque tubes, the two pull-in hooks, the midspan latches, and the other eighty percent of forward
cargo door skin?"

"They say they are unimportant."

"What do they say about the Orange Zone pieces, the possible mixup in cargo door sills, the unsooted pieces of center fuel tank, the thirty by forty foot shattered skin zone forward of the wing on the right side, the chafed to bare wire discovery in cargo door area, and the many significant matches to UAL 811?"

"Nothing. They say nothing. Well, actually they told me to go away, and stay away."

"Have you gone to your congressman?"

"Yes, Sam Farr, and he has asked many time to NTSB and FAA for information."

"What happened?"

"They wrote to him that the door was all latched, all locked, all intact at water impact, they have told me that many times, and thanked him for his interest in aviation safety."

"Did you contact any other elected politician?"
"Yes, Senator John McCain, jet plane crash survivor and Chairman of the Committed that oversees NTSB."

"What happened?"

"He reviewed my data and submitted it to his committee for review. He asked me to wait until the hearings. He asked the NTSB to meet with me to related my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800."

"What happened?"

"The Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation still has the matter under review, I waited until the hearings, I went to the hearings. The suggested meeting by Senator McCain between NTSB officials and me was refused by Chairman Hall of NTSB saying there was sufficient evidence to rule out the cargo door opening in flight, he has told me that many times in great detail and a meeting was not necessary."

"Have you tried the press?"

"Yes, I've had several radio and TV interviews. Some get airplay and some don't."

"Have you tried Boeing?"
"Yes, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas both contacted before the merger. The two safety officers were polite and referred me to NTSB. Boeing engineers referred me to the Public Relations office of Boeing. The Boeing Public Relations office referred me to the NTSB. NTSB told me to go away."

"Have you tried the internet?"

Yes, I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website which has been online since July, 1996 and visited about 70000 times, according to page counters."

"What are you doing now?"

"I'm continuing to write to appropriate officials presenting the evidence and trusting it will speak for itself. It's not going to go away."

"Have you tried calling them?"

"No, my wife and daughter were approached in my home by two armed federal agents within twenty four hours of me posting an email to Senator McCain about Air Force One crashing. Calling on the telephone out of the blue would be much too aggressive. Prior to the Secret Service interrogation, phone calls usually ended up with the official shouting and
hanging up. So now I continue to write non-threatening, polite, full of facts letters and emails.

"Are you saying government public safety aviation officials in writing refuse to adequately respond to your request for a meeting to discuss facts, evidence, documents, photos, which clearly indicate a forward cargo door opening in flight on TWA 800?"

"Yes."

"They will not call you, write to you, or respond to polite letters with sources listed?"

"Nope."

"Are these the same guys that say safety is priority number one, they will turn over every stone, never give up to get a full explanation, and respond to every public inquiry?"

"Yup."

"Who are you? A wacky guy on the 'net?"

"Maybe, although I use government AARs for sources, and I'm also a survivor"
of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash, a commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, light aircraft owner, jet carrier navigator, avionics technician including radar operator, and a retired military officer in a converted garage with a computer and a phone line."

"And you've tried for almost two years to meet face to face with the public officials involved with TWA 800?"

"Yes."

What happened?

"Nothing yet. But I'm still trying. It's only been two years for TWA 800. The investigation is open and active. The evidence is not changing or going away."

And I am still trying:

Real facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. Initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:
1. Water in forward cargo bay.
2. Chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. Electrical short occurs.
4. Forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. Aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. Pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. Cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. Shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. Explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. Ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. Wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. Fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating
tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

I may not be alone: "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Regarding the Aviation Week and Space Technology article quoted above, the following is supplied: <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>

Monica Warnock
Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

Dear Ms. Monica Warnock, 21 May 1998

You wrote to me: You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

I replied: Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right."
Ms. Warnock, I now believe you to be wrong.

I'm putting the 10 March 97 Aviation Week and Space Technology article in dispute back up on my web site at www.corazon.com at one minute after midnight on 1 June 1998.

Here's why: The content is everything and the content of the article is very, very important. I agree with the content. AvWeek agrees with content. The public officials quoted in your article agree with the content. The content quotes a public NTSB official who says that the cause of TWA 800 may have been forward door popping open. It also said the streak seen before TWA 800 crash may have been reflection off the skin of aircraft. I agree with that. It is very important. Let us call it the door pop streak article.

Ms. Warnock, you have done your job well by searching the web for Avweek articles. You found one. You then followed orders and directed it be removed. It was removed. The problem is now above your level of authority. So I direct my comments to your boss: Mary Francis Koerner, the
Manager of Bureaus.

Will you please see that this letter goes to her?

Dear Ms. Koerner, I am told several things:
1. Get the door pop streak article off my web site.
2. I should ask permission to put AvWeek articles on web site.
3. Permission will be denied.

I asked permission. It was denied. You were right.

You have done all you can do. The problem is now above your level of authority. I assume you would refer me to 'The Lawyers.' I direct my statements to the lawyers.

Will you please see that this letter goes to them?

Dear AvWeek lawyers:

Ah, copyright, don't you love it?

My name is John Barry Smith. I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website at www.corazon.com mainly devoted to high time Boeing 747 accidents in which the hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing. It contains mostly government scanned in aviation accident reports, AARs, and occasionally copyrighted material from media, such as yours.

Please note, let us stipulate:
1. My site is non profit. I have not made a penny on anything related to that website. In fact, much of my money has gone out, nothing has come in, a problem as my wife will attest.

2. It is research oriented with airplane crash related comments, investigations, reports, pictures, and text.

3. I give full and clear credit to the sources I quote. AvWeek was clearly stated as the author of the door pop streak 10 Mar 97 article in question. In fact, that is very important, that's why I quote clearly and give credit to Aviation Week by scanning in the entire article instead of paraphrasing, which would be quicker to download but not have the authority of the best aviation magazine on the planet, Aviation Week and Space Technology. And I omitted the advertising on the pages, too.

Now for argument:

1. I stole nothing from you.
2. It's fair use.
3. I can publish that article without your permission if certain conditions are met, and are: Non profit, small parts used, and credit given.

"Fair use and implied licenses. Fair use is a legal license to use others' work, whether they
approve or not. It constitutes one of the most important, and least clear cut, limits to copyright. The basic problem is that words like "fair" or "reasonable" cannot be defined with the precision non-lawyers (or many law students) would like. Until 20 years ago, fair use did not appear in U.S. legislation, but it now occupies about half of the copyright statute. In the U.S., partial or limited reproduction of another's work may be permitted under this doctrine.

On the one hand, fair use offers an especially liberal defense to uses that advance public interests such as education or scholarship. On the other hand, it is unlikely to be available if one fails to credit the original artist or author. It is not apt to be available to those who profit or interfere with original artists' or authors' ability to derive income from their works.

" 1998 Franklin Pierce Law Center. All rights reserved." (I hope I have fair use to quote the above.)

I believe I advance the public interest in aviation safety, I credit the original speaker, the reporter, and the magazine, and I do not profit from it. I have fair use.

Conclusion: It will take a Judge to order me to remove the 10
March 97
AvWeek article from my website after it is put back up on 1 June 1998 or to permit me to continue to post it.

So, Lawyers, the problem is above your level of authority. I turn my attention to the Managing Editor:

Will you please see that this letter goes to him?

Dear Managing Editor,

What's the beef? You and your reporter, David Fulghum, have done a fine piece of work. You have pinpointed the cause of a mystery crash now under current investigation, TWA 800. It was the door popping open in flight. The NTSB official you quoted was correct. The streak was the skin spinning away reflecting evening red orange sunlight to observers below. The official was correct and he was quoted correctly by your aviation reporter. The implications of the truth you printed are profound. The cause now leads to chafed wiring shorting on cargo door unlatch motor and allowing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door which opened in flight. Exactly as has happened before with UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. The 300
knot slipstream tore the nose off TWA 800 because the explosive
decompression shatter zone was much bigger on TWA 800 than
on UAL 811, as
shown by NTSB reconstruction photo of TWA 800 wreckage.

I encourage you to do a follow up story on the wiring/cargo door
explanation as described on the website in question,
www.corazon.com. Mr.
Fulghum and Mr. McKenna are familiar with the details of TWA
800 and wiring
cargo door explanation.

Attached:

1. Correspondence between AvWeek Ms. Warnock and me.

2. Three .jpgs of the images published on website of 10 March
door pop
streak article.

3. Recent email to Government officials regarding this matter.
Please note
accurate numbers and sources given.

So, I must publish your copyrighted material, the 10 March 97
article on my
website at URL http://www.corazon.com/
800avweekintrigue.html on June 1,
1998.

I'm at email barry@corazon.com or 408 659 3552 or 551
Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924.
I encourage discussion regarding this matter. It's a hot story even though almost two years old. Wiring is the main culprit, not the door, not the center tank. NSTB is in the right church but the wrong pew. Wiring is the problem and it's in places other than the fuel tank tubes. It's in the cargo door unlatching motor circuits.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 10:24:37 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Aviation Week
Mime-Version: 1.0

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Your website "http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html" contains several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.
Aviation Week & Space Technology is covered by copyright law which states that permission must be granted before our material is used. Your website is in violation of this law. You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Sincerely,
Monica Warnock
Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology
monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
(202)383-2314

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Request permission to present article on website.
Cc: 
Bcc: 
X-Attachments:

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.

Dear Madam, 14 May 1998

A thousand pardons. I immediately request permission to reprint Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997 on my website, www.corazon.com. (Corazon is my wife's name.)

The reason I scanned in exact image instead of paraphrasing text was to be precise and show source, very important for a research paper.

Should my request be denied, I shall of course, immediately comply with your request and remove the article from my web site.

AWST is a fine magazine and one which I have read diligently for over thirty years. I have watched AWST's web site mature as time goes on. http://awgnet.com/awgnews.htm is on my bookmarks list and I check it first thing every morning. I'm in your database of subscribers. Keep up the good work!

Regarding this life and death matter of a sudden night fiery fatal
jet
plane crash about which I have published a 1200 page website
presenting my
shorted wiring opening forward cargo door in flight explanation
to the
general public in a non profit effort:

1. You surely understand I can not alter my website just on an
unsolicited
email out of the blue from:

   Monica Warnock
   Washington Bureau
   Aviation Week & Space Technology
   monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
   (202)383-2314

The absence of title indicates your request may be personal in
nature and
not official. Please confirm your official title which corresponds
to your
request that I delete an article from AWST from my site. You
may be
spoofing me and my asking for credentials is prudent and an
established
protocol.

2. Your response indicates an interest in the subject of TWA 800.
Could you
refer a reporter to me so I can present my wiring/cargo door
explanation to
him/her? I would appreciate the opinion of an aviation
professional
regarding my nine years of amateur research into hull ruptures of hour high
time Boeing 747s. Your reporter, David Fuhlgum, in the
referenced article,
was able to elicit important material from NTSB officials
regarding TWA
800; the forward door may have popped open in flight, and the
streak may
have been pieces of the aircraft reflecting evening sun. I am able
to amplify those observations by an anonymous NTSB 'second
official' using
NTSB documents and photographs. It's a good story and one
worthy of AWST's
interest. FAA, NSTB, and Boeing are all saying wiring in older
Boeing
airliners is fraying and shorting causing problems, and so am I, long
before the officials came to the realization.

3. >or we will consider legal action.

Why, O why did you threaten me? Your first contact, out of the
blue, and it
contains a threat of 'legal action'. What does that mean? I don't
think it
means a good thing. It just sets a wrong tone. Is politeness gone
from even
presentations about a plane crash?

4. >Your website is in violation of this law.

Whoa! You are calling me a criminal? Just like that? I'm breaking
the law?
I'm a lawbreaker? This is very disturbing. Maybe that's the way AWST works
with the big boys who only respond to threats, not to polite requests with
explanation attached. I'm not a big boy. I'm a retired military officer
working out of a converted garage in California. I don't like anybody
telling me I'm breaking the law unless it's a policeman, judge, or jury.
And I still don't like it, but I obey. I really can't tell my friends that
I changed my cherished web site because of a strange unauthenticated email
from some babe named Monica at McGraw-Hill, now can I? I mean, am I a man
or a mouse?

See, a threat always turns a pleasant conversation into stressful one.
Squeek, squeek.

To review:

1. I respectfully request permission to display scanned in images of
Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object,"

2. Please to show credentials, madam.
4. Refer reporter to me regarding a subject that you feel strongly enough
to want to affect with correspondence, TWA 800.

5. Keep up the good work covering aviation subjects around the world.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 13:48:41 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: Request permission to present article on website.
Mime-Version: 1.0

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of
Aviation Week
& Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She is the
Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints &
Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation Week on
outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.
Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology does not allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than our own. We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology; however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 383-2332.

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.
Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of Aviation Week & Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She is the Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints & Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation Week on outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.

Dear Ms. Monica,

Thank you for your prompt reply. I am saddened by the denial to present the AWST article on my web site. I shall search through it and delete it. Do I need permission to post your email in its place to explain why the article was deleted? I should explain why the article was removed to
squelch any
cracy coverup nonsense that pervades this TWA 800 investigation.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology does not
allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than our own.

So sad.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology;
however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as
you have indicated you are willing to do.

As soon as I am finished with this upcoming TV interview about wiring/cargo
door explanation, I will. The TV station is KOMO-TV, Channel 4, ABC, in
Seattle Washington and the arrive within the hour. I'm preparing for it so
I am unable now to find page, delete, change links, upload it to server right
now. But how long to I have? Is 48 hours OK?

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the
magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding
copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy
and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

Protecting the magazine? Well, OK, if you say so. I feel that quoting AWST in a non profit website about aviation safety helps AWST, but what do I know.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 383-2332.

Thank you very much, ma'am, and I shall. I shall say you referred me, is that OK?

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Fine, can I put that on my website?

Let me get back to you on this. I will delete offending article and then send you URL of the new page so you can confirm I have cleansed the dirty
deed.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Monica Warnock  
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 14:47:54 -0500  
To: <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Re[2]: Request permission to present article on website.  
Mime-Version: 1.0

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to
place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now-
as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine
with us. The complete URL is
<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>
If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again,
thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock  
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology
To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Done  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  

Dear Ms. Warnock,  

You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.  

Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right.  

http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html  

is the URL which now has deleted article. Completed 6:57PM 14 May 97, nine hours after your request. The TV interview went swimmingly. In fact, the interviewer from KOMO TV ABC Seattle, asked that I send him an email of the article in question. He was interested to hear about your request.  

I just want you to know that you have made an old man very very sad. I shall have to research the web, as is my wont, to find out for sure if the copyright laws exist to keep non profit websites from fairly using
one article of a magazine to support an aviation safety hypothesis. I make no money from this site, on the contrary, it costs me money to keep it up. The site is 1200 pages deep with on one page assigned to article. The goal of the website is aviation safety, a common goal with Aviation Week. The officials quoted on the article are public officials whose comments are public.

It seems to me that permission should not be necessary for me to put your article on my website as long as I give credit to the author and make no money from it.

It seems to me that when permission was requested to put the article on my website, permission should have been granted.

You said 'protect your magazine,' as motive for requesting I delete the article. Protection from whom? Me? Aviation Week needs protection from me? I am a retired guy working out of a converted garage with a computer and a modem. You have nothing to fear from me, we are on the same side, aviation safety.
Regardless, the excellent article by David Fulghum in the March 10, 1997 issue has been deleted at your request. Should it become apparent that I do have the fair right to use your article under conditions which I fulfill, then, pop! up it goes again. I shall let you know in advance so you may attempt to dissuade me if you wish. It just seems that a guy ought to be able to pull out old magazine articles to quote from when he's trying to persuade visitors of an aviation safety point. In case I'm wrong, and I'm never wrong, I have erred on the side of safety and complied with your request.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now- as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine with us. The complete URL is <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html> If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again,
thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON

Two New York Air National Guard pilots, with the best view of the crash of TWA Flight 800 last July, are disagreeing about what they saw immediately before destruction of the Boeing 747-131 jetliner.

One believes the airliner was struck by a fast-moving object coming from the east, while the other saw only a fiery trail from the west.

However, both believe a violent explosion ripped the aircraft apart, propelling some of its passengers high enough that they did not hit the water's surface until 3-4 min. after the initial explosion.

Maj. Frederick C. Meyer, pilot of an HH-60 helicopter from the ANG's 106th Rescue Wing, has just been freed from an FBI gag order preventing him from giving interviews about the 1996 disaster off Long Island, N.Y. The copilot, Capt. Christian Baur, remains under FBI restrictions not to speak about the accident. But two officials familiar with his testimony told
Aviation Week &
Space Technology in detail what he told investigators.

In the days immediately after the accident, before being ordered not to speak, Meyer discussed his initial impressions with news media (AW&ST July 29, 1996, p. 32). Last week, he chose Aviation Week as the first news organization to hear a detailed account of his recollections and his testimony to federal investigators.

Meyer and Baur were in one of the wing's two aircraft operating north of the crash site. The helicopter was operating over Long Island about 12 mi. north of the TWA crash site. Baur, the copilot, was at the controls practicing instrument approaches. The crew was awaiting darkness so they could begin training with night vision goggles.

The key point on which the two pilots disagree is whether a streak of light appeared from the opposite direction of the flight of TWA 800 (which was flying from west to east after takeoff from Kennedy Airport), a possible indication of an intercepting missile or some other object.

Meyer's attention was first called to the area of the sky where the accident
occurred "by a streak of light moving from my right (west) to my left (east)," the same direction as the TWA flight, he said.

Baur's account differs on this point. According to the two officials who have heard both pilots' accounts, Baur, on the left side of the cockpit, saw a streak moving from left to right toward the approaching TWA aircraft before the initial explosion.

"Almost due south [of the helicopter], there was a hard white light, like burning pyrotechnics, in level flight," Baur told investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, FBI and a Federal anti-terrorist task force. "I was trying to figure out what it was. It was the wrong color for flares. It struck an object coming from the right and made it explode."

Baur's first impression was that there had been a midair collision, possibly between two light aircraft that tow banners along the beach.

"They had witnessed these aircraft come very close to each other at that time of day, and that's what they assumed," the second official said.

NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots
saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said.

Meyer could not actually see the aircraft, but only the streak, and he admits that Baur, a younger man, has better eyesight. Moreover, Meyer adds, "Whatever Chris saw on the left side I didn't see because he blocked my view." Baur disputes this, saying that the explosions and crash were virtually dead ahead of the aircraft.

The helicopter was executing a missed approach and was about halfway down Runway 24 at the Francis S. Gabreski International Airport at Westhampton Beach, N.Y. It had started a climbing left turn to the south when the accident occurred. The Sun had not yet set and the sky was still bright.

According to Meyer, the streak was about 15-20 deg. above his line of sight and perhaps 15 deg. left of the aircraft's centerline.

"I don't know if it was a missile that struck the airliner," Meyer said. "Nothing at that moment said 'missile' to me. I spent a number of
years in Vietnam and had seen missiles fired, some of them at me. But, that was 25-year-old missile technology, which left smoke trails. I understand today that they are made with smokeless rocket fuel and don't leave trails. What I saw was a streak of light, not a smoke trail."

The streak of light that Meyer saw made a very shallow, gradually descending arc. He points out that he never saw the actual airframe of the TWA 747 within the streak or subsequent explosions or smoke trails. It was virtually identical to the trajectory of a meteor, with only a slight curve. But unlike a meteor, the streak was red-orange in color, he said.

Meyer observed the descending streak for 3-5 sec. Then there was what Meyer describes as a hard, very sudden, yellowish-white explosion that looked identical to the detonation of an antiaircraft shell. He did not suggest an antiaircraft weapon was fired at TWA Flight 800, however.

"It left a cloud of smoke just like a flak explosion does," Meyer said. "One to two seconds later, there was a second, hard explosion almost pure white in color. The position of that explosion appeared to be slightly below and
behind where one would have anticipated the streak of light to have gone. The trajectory at that point appeared to be slightly bent down and slowed."

A new detail in Meyer's story was that almost immediately there was a third explosion and fireball. Meyer doesn't remember if there was an explosion and fireball or if the third explosion turned into the fireball.

"That was a soft explosion unlike the first two," Meyer said. "It began as a tiny point and it grew very rapidly into a huge fireball four times the diameter of the Sun. I was dumbstruck."

Baur also saw three explosions. But he contends that they started from left (east) and went to right (west). He said the explosions created a "huge waterfall of flame that cascaded down," the first official said. "The column of flame was being whipped around violently. First it was tumbling, and then it refined itself into a spiral. The explosions were all before the cascade of flame began."

In the helicopter, Baur spoke first, asking if it was pyrotechnics. ANG operations that night were to have included flares dropped by a HC-130
transport aircraft. The crew then called the Gabreski tower.

"We said we'd observed a fireball south of the field and we would like clearance to the beach to investigate," Meyer said. Baur actually made the call and reported a possible midair collision, the second official involved in the investigation said.

The crash time has been variously reported as being from 8:31 to 8:45 p.m., Meyer said. He believes the earlier time is more likely to be correct although he can't be sure.

Baur continued to fly the helicopter during the search while Meyer functioned as copilot and primary communicator. As they approached the crash site, after about 4 min. of flight, debris was still falling so they slowed to avoid being hit.

"As they got closer, within two or three miles, Baur could see the aircraft body, not tumbling, but in a vortex almost like inside a tornado," the second official said.

Meyer made another revelation that was the result of long reflection after the accident.
"I was looking ahead . . . as we approached the crash site," Meyer said. "I saw some debris at 1,200-1,300 ft. falling at terminal velocity and fuselage fragments tumbling at 40-50 mi. per hour. The things falling at high speed were bodies still strapped in their seats. That is logically inconsistent if they came from the same explosion at the same time. On reflection, I have concluded that the bodies must have been blown upward before they came down. That indicates a violent explosion."

On this point, the two pilots' accounts agree, the officials said.

"Debris was falling like snow," according to Baur's testimony. "Among the particulate there was metal and paper, some of it glowing. Through all of that, things would come racing through -- two or three high-speed objects like sacks of potatoes. I believed them to be bodies that had been blown upward."

The pilots' opinion differ from the conclusion of inspectors that all the passengers were in the fuselage when it ripped apart from aerodynamic forces.

In an attempt to debunk the most egregious coverup and conspiracy theories,
Meyer and other ANG officials remain adamant that their unit was not part of any larger, undisclosed, multiservice operation. Operations the night of the crash were standard training flights to maintain currency with night vision goggles, rescue operations and in-air refueling.

The HH-60 flight was to be of about two hours' duration and would not extend more than 2 mi. off the Long Island southern coast. The HC-130 would drop flares, rafts and a para-rescueman and later refuel the helicopter in a communications-out, lights-out operation.

"No other people of other services were on the base at the time," Meyer said. Nor were there indications of the operations of drone aircraft, another theory that has surfaced as the possible cause of the crash. "No, there would have been some kind of notice."

AW&ST 3/10/97

Until the streak is adequately explained, the missile explanation will always be possible. I say missile explanation will always be could be, but wasn't. The evidence refutes every missile explanation suggested event. Likewise for meteor and bomb explanations, they will always be
could have been, but weren't.

The center tank did catch fire and there was a fireball, so center tank explanation will always be could have been and was, the only issue is when.

The wiring/cargo door explanation explains the streak, refutes the bomb and meteor, and supplements the center tank explanation.

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is the more correct, more complete explanation.

I urge that Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring be grounded until wiring is checked in cargo door areas known to have been faulty in the past.

I again request to meet with NTSB officials to present my wiring/cargo door explanation.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 12, 1998 2:38:13 PM PDT
To: John.Dimtroff@FAA.DOT.GOV
Subject: Red Paint Transfer Marks TWA 800 Cargo Door Area

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
1117 Longworth Bldg
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg
Washington, DC 20510-0303

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Robert Francis II
Vice Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Bernard Loeb,
Director of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas E. Haueter
Chief, Major Investigations Division
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

John B. Drake
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National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Al Dickinson,
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National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594
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Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

James F. Wildey II
National Resource Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

David Mayer
NTSB Wreckage Database Manager
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas McSweeney
Director, Aircraft Certification Service
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Washington D.C 20591

Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI
Aircraft Accident Investigator
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591
Dear Mr. Dimtroff and Official Persons who feel responsibility in explaining TWA 800,

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame.

The above details a red paint transfer mark on the right
horizontal tail surface of TWA 800 directly aft of the red painted trim in cargo door area. This area shows missing red paint clearly in NTSB photo displayed at URL <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html>

The NTSB photographs are clear in color and detail. The TWA 800 reconstruction photograph shows abnormal green, white and red paint on the right side forward of the wing.

Normal TWA red trim paint scheme is seen at<http://www.corazon.com/twapaintpixweb.html> Only above the forward cargo door of the reconstructed fuselage of TWA 800 is seen the abnormal red paint smears.

The sequence is thus: bare aluminum skin is cleaned, primed, base coat of white applied, then red trim on top of white, then decals. This sequence is basic painting for Boeing 747s and confirmed by aviation professionals.

It is not red paint trim on primer with overspray, mask off, then paint white base coat around the trim.

The red trim is always on top of white base coat and means that the many, red, and large red paint smears between the passenger windows are red paint transfer marks. The red paint marks are not red paint exposed when white above is worn away, it is always red on top of white, not underneath.

This is further proven by skin which has red paint missing and thus exposing white undercoat. This is seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html> The white is always underneath the red. The green is always underneath the white.
Additionally, the added red paint between the windows is next to the missing red paint in the trim above the cargo door. Red paint went from one area to another.

The many red and large red paint transfer marks above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 indicate the cargo door opened in flight. The precedent of cargo door paint transfer marks was set by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02, page 41.

The red paint transfer marks indicate the red door below ruptured/opened in flight and slammed into the white paint above, removing the red trim paint and transferring it on top of the white paint. This is clearly seen between the passenger windows.

The red paint evidence coupled with the outward peeled skin on the side, and in the door area, and in the belly proves an explosive event occurred inflight in the cargo door area.

The downward crushed main floor beams confirm the explosive event. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door pinpoints the location of the initial rupture of
the hull of TWA 800 as seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/petalbulge.html> The aft latch is missing, the door frame is curved outward, and surrounding skin is shaped circular.

The analysis of red paint markings and structural deformation indicating an outward explosion was briefly held by FAA Branch Manager Neil Schalekamp of Northwest Region in a letter to me on 30 Jan 1998. "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

The cause of the outward cargo door explosion being the center tank is refuted by the lack of soot on the few recovered forward cargo door pieces and other right side fuselage pieces. Exhibit 20A page 129. Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report. "RF2 C-004 No sooting No sooting RF3A-H These pieces are part of the forward main cargo door. Some have grimy corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC), but there is no apparent sooting. These pieces are part of the forward main cargo door. Some have grimy corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC), but there is no apparent sooting. RF4 B-103 No sooting No sooting RF5 A-071 No sooting No sooting RF6A B-2004 No sooting No sooting RF6B B-240 No sooting No sooting RF6C B-318 No sooting No sooting RF7 A-033 No sooting No sooting RF8A No sooting No sooting
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NTSB investigators also are intrigued by the aircraft forward door popping open in flight, an explanation supported by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, and petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Basic NTSB generated evidence for TWA 800 in photos, text, sooting diagrams, tables, and drawings, a NTSB produced report AAR 92/02, and your visual interpretations of NTSB photograph at <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html> and on NTSB CD-ROM proves that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight.

The evidence above proves the the cargo door was not all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, as previously believed based upon examination of only eight of the ten cargo door latches. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that
all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

The cause of the door opening in flight is probably the same as UAL 811, as described in AAR 92/02; chafed wiring shorting on door unlatch motor based upon NTSB evidence for TWA 800 in Docket Exhibit 9A page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

NTSB agrees that a new explanation for the destruction sequence is possible based on new interpretations of the evidence such as shown by the red paint smears. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 must be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out the reasonable conclusions reached by the careful analysis of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, and cracked to bare conductor wires discovered in TWA 800 by NTSB.

The wreckage of TWA 800 is the victim at autopsy. It is the victim saying look at me, I exploded in flight, right there at the aft midspan latch. Just like I did before in 1989 with UAL 811
and left paint smears, outward peeled skin, aft midspan latch rupture, sudden loud sound on the CVR and power cut to the FDR. Don't ignore me; don't deny me; do something about me.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith  
551 Country Club Drive  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
408 659 3552  
barry@corazon.com  
www.corazon.com  
Citizen: USA  
Major: US Army Retired  
Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.  
Navigator: RA5C Vigilante  
Owner: Mooney M20C  
Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash.

Facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear  
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3  
3. inward crush top of cargo door  
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge  
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch  
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches  
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces of plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in database
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:
1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 23, 1998 4:45:27 PM PDT
To: John.Dimtroff@FAA.DOT.GOV
Subject: My errors corrected

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
1117 Longworth Bldg
Washington, DC 20515-2861
John McCain III  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and  
Transportation  
United States Senate  
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg  
Washington, DC 20510-0303

James Hall  
Chairman,  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Robert Francis II  
Vice Chairman  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Bernard Loeb,  
Director of Aviation Safety  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas E. Haueter  
Chief, Major Investigations Division  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

John B. Drake
Division Chief
Aviation Engineering Division
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Al Dickinson,
Lead Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Ron Schleede,
Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

James F. Wildey II
National Resource Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

David Mayer
NTSB Wreckage Database Manager
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas McSweeny
Director, Aircraft Certification Service
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Washington D.C 20591

Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI
Aircraft Accident Investigator
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591

Ron Wojnar,
Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Neil Schalekamp
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety Branch
Transport Standards Staff
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,
Aerospace Engineer,
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056
Dear Mr. Dimtroff, June 23, 1998

NTSB just sent me a two page letter. It was indirectly from Dr. Bernard Loeb. The first page was a form letter from NTSB reporting that I had used the wrong zip code on my hand addressed letter to Dr. Bernard Loeb. The second page was a copy of the misaddressed letter which was my 13 March 1998 letter to everyone addressed above.

This recent letter from NTSB tells me much. It tells me Dr. Bernard Loeb received the letter all right because the correction came from NTSB which means NTSB received it all right and everyone in NTSB knows Dr. Bernard Loeb as the Director of Aviation Safety and point man for TWA 800. I assume that Director Loeb gives close scrutiny to my letters to catch a one digit zip code error from incorrect 20591 to correct 20594. I assume this is a way for Director Loeb to point out errors in my correspondence.

And he's right. It was an error. It may be trivial in this case but potentially catastrophic when flying. As a navigator I recognize a serious error and the lack of attention to detail in a wrong number. It is a mistake I shall remember always. Dr. Bernard Loeb has shown me the need to check my numbers. Accuracy is everything in aviation and one digit being wrong is enough to kill. It happened with a Korean flightcrewmember avoiding the digit '4' and putting in a different number into his inertial navigation computer which then led him, his plane and his passengers over enemy territory which led to a shootdown, KAL 007. It happened to me when hand addressing envelopes of hard copy letters to back up the electronic emails. I checked out the error and traced it to a mixup of zip codes between NTSB and FAA. NTSB is 20594 and FAA is 20591 and I mixed them up.
There is an additional error on my address to Dr. Bernard Loeb. I put "490 L'Enfant Plaza East SW" instead of the correct "490 L'Enfant Plaza SW."

The principle is the same: Errors kill and accuracy counts.

I shall follow the example of NTSB and recognize the error and correct it.

I may have made another error recently in regard to TWA 800: I said that the many large red paint marks between the passenger windows above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 wreckage were 'transfer marks'. I stated they were red marks from the red fuselage skin below coming up and smashing into the white and leaving the red paint on top, similar to UAL 811.

There is now serious dissent that states the many large red paint marks are red paint from overspray of the trim below. The red marks are revealed white paint between the passenger windows is peeled back, revealing the red underneath. Several painters of airliners give conflicting opinion. The conclusive evidence is on the wreckage of TWA 800.

I ask NTSB and Director Loeb, can you confirm the paint sequence for the many large red paint marks between the passenger windows as seen in URL http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html and http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html? Are they red on top of white paint, or are they red underneath white paint? Is the red underneath or on top?

It's vitally important. If red is underneath white, then I have
made another error and wish to correct it. If red on top of white then it appears that the red could have come from skin below opening up and slamming together causing paint transfer marks, thus confirming cargo door opened in flight.

There is no expense involved, only a short time for a metallurgist to climb up on a stepladder with a magnifying glass and look at the TWA 800 red paint marks.

As NTSB pointed out to me, numbers are to be accurate. I believe NTSB also respects numbers.

That's why eight is not ten. And never will be. That's why all ten of the forward cargo door latches must be recovered and examined and determined to have been operating normally before the cargo door is ruled out as culprit. That conclusive examination of all ten has not been done and that's why the forward cargo door can not be ruled out.

As NTSB told me to use the right numbers in my zip code, I ask NTSB to use the right numbers on the forward cargo door. There are ten identical latching pins and cams on that door and examining only eight is not good, not trivial, and wrong for NTSB.

For me to write NTSB zip code accurately is right for me. To check all ten latches is right for NTSB.

The two missing midspan latches that NTSB have not examined have been shown to carry loads as reported in AAR 92/02 where the aft midspan latch pin showed heat damage from hard contact. All ten latches are vital for proper operation of that door.
Only checking eight of ten is as bad as putting 20591 instead of 20594.

So, I acknowledge an error pointed out to me by NTSB and I remark on another error nearby, and corrected both.

I ask that NTSB do the same for themselves.

There is additional NTSB evidence which is perplexing if the center tank explosion as initial event is to be confirmed:

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge." And same page: "A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame."

Seat track, glitter, stator blade and red paint all had to come from up front because that's where they were. All of these items must have become embedded in the horizontal stabilizer in flight, because it's the only way they could have gotten there based upon the separation of nose and tail long before water impact. The only way for the stuff in front to get to the back in flight is for it to come out of the forward baggage hold. One very good way, a reasonable way, a way that's happened before, is for the forward cargo door to come open inflight and allow glitter contents of cargo bins, a seat track, and red painted door top to be blown aft. It also allows a foddled engine three to cause stator
blade to be thrown out and back into right horizontal stabilizer.

A way to rule a repeat door opening event out is to examine the door and determine if it was functioning normally. That can not be done yet because only eight of ten latches have been recovered as well as on 20% of the door structure. Until door totally recovered it can not be totally ruled out. Until cargo door totally ruled out, TWA 800 investigation is not totally complete.

Examining many large red paint markings can assist in that determination. Are the red paint marks on top of the white paint or underneath the white paint between the passenger windows above the forward cargo door?

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com
Citizen: USA
Major: US Army Retired
Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.
Navigator: RA5C Vigilante
Owner: Mooney M20C
Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: July 2, 1998 9:34:07 PM PDT
To: John.Dimtroff@FAA.DOT.GOV
Subject: Response to Chairman Hall's letter to Congressman Farr.

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
1117 Longworth Bldg
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg
Washington, DC 20510-0303

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Robert Francis II
Vice Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Bernard Loeb,
Director of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas E. Haueter
Chief, Major Investigations Division
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

John B. Drake
Division Chief
Aviation Engineering Division
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Al Dickinson,
Lead Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Ron Schleede,
Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

James F. Wildey II
National Resource Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

David Mayer
NTSB Wreckage Database Manager
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas McSweeny
Director, Aircraft Certification Service
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Washington D.C 20591

Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI
Aircraft Accident Investigator
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591

Ron Wojnar,
Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Neil Schalekamp
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety Branch
Transport Standards Staff
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,
Aerospace Engineer,
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Mr. Dimtroff,

July 2, 1998

Congressman Sam Farr sent me a letter on June 16th enclosing a letter to him from Chairman Jim Hall on June 8th discussing TWA 800 and cargo door cause. The letter from Chairman Hall to Congressman Hall contains various inaccuracies which require clarification:

Chairman Hall, "...Mr. Smith expressed his belief that the failure or cargo door led to the accident."

Chairman Hall has misstated my 'belief.' My belief is a wiring short led to the accident. As NTSB states a wiring short led to center tank explosion led to the accident, I say a wiring short led to cargo door rupturing in flight leading to the accident. Cargo door did not 'fail'; it did what it was told to do, unlatch.

Chairman Hall, "...numerous letters..."
Yes, that's correct. Three hundred and thirty eight to NTSB officials since July 20, 1996, three days after TWA 800, all with same consistent explanation; hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side at cargo door area. After researching hull ruptures on high time 747s for seven years, it was readily apparent that TWA 800 matched the previous accidents, one of which was confirmed as wiring/cargo door caused, UAL 811.

Chairman Hall, "Examination of the wreckage has not revealed any evidence..."

This is the Chairman of NTSB's opinion about a probable cause and is same as the Chairman of NTSB's opinion in 1990 about the forward cargo door for UAL 811 in AAR 90/01 which was in error and corrected with AAR 92/02. The forward cargo door has opened and fooled before.

Chairman Hall, "The cargo doors were found with their respective fuselage sections..."

Not accurate. Only 60% in pieces of the aft cargo door and only 20% in pieces of the forward cargo door were found, recovered and examined. Twenty percent of a door is not 'a door.'

Chairman Hall, "...the examination of the cargo door latches found that they were closed at the time of impact."

Not true. There are ten latches on each door and only eight of the forward door were examined because only eight were recovered. Above quote also implies some latches opened but not in flight. What is the status of the forward midspan latches? Found? Open or closed? Damaged? They are not in the wreckage database, they are not hung on wreckage reconstruction, and they are not
discussed in the forward cargo door Exhibit 15C.

Chairman Hall, "Safety Board metallurgists and structures engineers have carefully examined the cargo door..."

Not true because it's impossible. Only 60% in pieces of the aft cargo door and only 20% in pieces of the forward cargo door were found so it was impossible to carefully examine the cargo doors. Missing from the forward cargo door recovery are two midspan latches, manual locking handle, eight viewing ports, two overpressure relief doors, and 80% of the door skin. Most of the forward cargo door is not in wreckage recovery database nor hung on wreckage reconstruction. Who is the 'metallurgist? Mr. Wildey? Who is the 'structures engineer'? Mr. Breneman? Asking someone who said something once to say it again is not an impartial confirmation of a questioned evaluation.

Chairman Hall, "...carefully examined...the latching mechanisms..."

Not true. Only eight of the ten latching mechanisms were recovered to be examined. Two latches have not been examined at all.

Chairman Hall, "...carefully examined...the surrounding structure..."

Not accurate. Most of the surrounding structure is missing. Many nearby large red unusual paint markings were not evaluated.

Chairman Hall, "...found no evidence of pre-impact failure..."

Not supported opinion. There is much clear visual evidence of
pre-impact failure with petal shaped rupture at aft midspan latch, outward peeled skin on side and belly, unilateral shattered fuselage in cargo door area, downward floor beams, and several large red paint markings between passenger windows only above cargo door.

Chairman Hall, "..no evidence...that the door had opened in flight."

Not true. A FAA structures engineer at one time agreed that paint markings and structural deformation indicated an outward explosion in cargo door area. There is much hard, real, and documented evidence below that forward cargo door ruptured/opened in flight.

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present 20.
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces of plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. TWA 800 matched to AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811.
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in database
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a
Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo
door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-
orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open
was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and
structural deformation indicated outward explosion.

I again ask for a meeting with an NTSB representative to present
my nine years of research for an impartial evaluation of the
evidence derived from official governmental aviation agencies.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov
Date: October 19, 2005 5:46:49 AM PDT
To: barry@qp6.com

John:

I'm interested in helping to alleviate some uncertainties in my
cousins family. My cousin Lois was killed recently in a medivac
helicopter accident in Seattle, on Sept 29, 05. The Airlift
Northwest helicopter lost contact with its base about 9:15 pm,
Sept 29. Wreckage was recovered in the Browns Bay area near Edmonds, WA.

Shortly after, local police agencies determined that the craft had sunk in an area too deep for their equipment to find and recover any of the craft. The Navy was asked to help in the recovery effort. The Navy was able to recover some of the craft however, all the craft was not recovered and Lois' body was never found. The recovery efforts were called off last week.

What my cousins family would like to know is what efforts were made to recover her body and how complete were efforts made to search for it.

They are not interested in pursuing any legal prosecution against anyone, only seeking this information for their own peace of mind.

I don't know how you might be able to help, since I found your email address while surfing the NTSB site. Can you help point us in the right direction? Some contacts with the Navy and NTSB would be helpful.

Thanks.

Joe Nakanishi
847-294-8461 Office

From: Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov
Date: October 25, 2005 12:46:43 PM PDT
To: John Barry Smith <barry@qp6.com>
Subject: Re: Another recent Agusta 109 positioning crash.
Thanks for the information John.

Our cousin John Suzuki will be briefed by NTSB in the next week or so, on their findings.

Don't think this will include much on the subsurface investigation done by the Navy though.

Thanks for the information.

Does this indicate anyhting to you, the fact that theres been two accidents with this craft in a month?

From: Lance.Nuckolls@faa.gov
Date: April 10, 2007 1:03:18 PM PDT
To: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysth smith.com>
Subject: L. Nuckolls is out of the office.

I will be out of the office starting 04/10/2007 and will not return until 04/12/2007.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:11 AM PDT
To: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: The FAA lady doth protest too much. Like a dog
covering up a kill...

12 DEC 2002 The DF AA unveiled plans for adding an onboard system to make commercial airliners' fuel tanks safer and reduce the chance of catastrophic explosions like the one that downed a TWA Boeing 747 in 1996. Inexpensive and lightweight, the onboard inerting system works by pumping nitrogen-enriched air into fuel tanks, thereby reducing the oxygen in fuel vapors and reducing flammability. (AP)

At 9:43 PM -0700 9/3/02, John Barry Smith wrote:
To: Ronald.Wojnar@faa.dot.gov,
    John.Dimtroff@FAA.DOT.GOV, Neil.Schalekamp@faa.dot.gov,
    Bob.Breneman@faa.dot.gov, Lyle.Streeter@faa.dot.gov
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: China Airlines Flight 611 cargo door strange areas...
Cc: 
Bcc: 

Dear FAA: 3 Sep 02

All the ADs in the world trying to make Trans World Airlines Flight 800 a center tank explosion as the initial event will not make that stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer go away which shows engine 3 uncontainment and therefore makes the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation a plausible, reasonable explanation with precedent of United Airlines Flight 811.

'Ron Wojnar, the FAA's deputy director of aircraft certification services, explained that submersion would prevent any sparks
from igniting fuel vapors.'

"The Paris-bound Boeing 747 exploded in a fireball at 13,700 feet, minutes after leaving John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 230 people on board were killed. "All of our pumps that were on Flight 800 were recovered and not found to be contributors to the crash," Ward said."

Let's see, the NTSB says center tank exploded as initial event with undetermined ignition source, FAA says check wiring around center tank and wiring for fuel pumps: but Trans World Airlines Flight 800 fuel pumps were OK. And FAA and NTSB never suggested checking wiring to cargo door although the photographs show shattered and torn door with precedent of United Airlines Flight 811.

Now it appears another cargo door in an early model Boeing 747 has ruptured in flight, China Airlines Flight 611.

It appears that Kay Yong of ASC, Neil Schalekamp of FAA, and Ken Smart of AAIB were open to apparently admit that the cargo door ruptured open inflight and the reasons may be a repair doubler failure, or a bomb, or a center tank explosion. I offer the United Airlines Flight 811 reason, wiring.

MICHAEL A. DORNHEIM

MD>Investigators have recovered the upper and lower parts of the aft cargo door of China Airlines Flight 611 still connected to the surrounding fuselage. A middle portion of the door hasn't been recovered yet.
That is assuming the missing piece(s) are only one; the middle may be in more than one piece.

Aft cargo door is located on the lower right fuselage behind the wing, and was recovered in several pieces. The upper part (top photo) is still hinged to the fuselage, and the lower part (green structure, below) is latched in place next to cargo rollers.

Conjecture: can't be sure about 'latched in place' until see it latched in place.

Even though both pieces are attached, Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council (ASC) has not ruled out the door as a cause, and in fact "we are paying more attention to it now than before," said Kay Yong, ASC managing director.

The cat is out of the bag. If and when they follow the evidence of what ruptured open cargo doors in flight do to Boeing 747s, it will become apparent it has happened at least four times before. Not ruling out the cargo door as a cause is to imply it could be the cause; such an obvious deduction but many are loathe to admit it.

"There are some strange areas that we can't explain right now; we need more evidence." ASC officials believe the aft fuselage of the Boeing 747-200, also known as Section 46, was the first area to come apart, and the aft cargo door is on the aft fuselage (AW&ST Aug. 5, p. 41).

Yes, strange areas. Yes, need more evidence.

The main thrust of the investigation is still a 21.7 X 16.7-ft. segment of Section 46 that includes the bulk cargo door, which is
to the rear of the aft cargo door. Laboratory analysis has confirmed there are fatigue cracks up to 9 in. long around a doubler. The doubler was used to repair tail-strike damage in 1980. The preliminary lab report needs further discussion before it is released, Yong said.

JBS> Lets see: The cracks did not crack, the doubler did not fail: The cargo door is shattered...and the main thrust is the.....doubler? Of course. Note that it is Mike Dornhiem saying main thrust, not the actual thruster: ASC.

MD> Recovery efforts are focusing on trying to find the right side of Section 46, including the aftmost passenger doors 4R and 5R. The aircraft did not have a passenger deck cargo door. Most of the left side has already been recovered. The ASC has started moving wreckage from the Penghu Islands to Tao Yuan AFB near Taipei, and plans to make a two-dimensional reconstruction of the rear fuselage and perhaps part of the forward fuselage. A 3D reconstruction may then be made to better explain findings to the public, Yong said.

JBS> Looking for the right side, the starboard side, the aft cargo door side, the shattered side, the side with precedent. They are on the right track. At least a 2D and maybe a 3D, that's very good.

Now, to the examination of the aft cargo door of China Airlines Flight 611:

Items identified:
Top hinge.
Outline of pressure relief doors.
Jagged metal at tear area about one third down.
Door actuator motor.
Pull in hook mechanism.
Bottom sill.
Cargo floor ball mats.
Torque tubes.
Thin fiberglass internal skin of door.
Non parallel lines of bottom of door and sill.
Some wiring inside door.
Cargo rollers.

Top: Vertical tear lines at aft and forward leading edge of the cargo door.
Missing pressure relief doors.
Longitudinal split about one third down from top.
Intact hinge and door attached to top fuselage skin.

Bottom:
Straight torque tubes apparently
Leading edge of door missing.
Edge of door and edge of fuselage sill not parallel.
Latches not seen in photo.
Some internal door cover missing and bent.

Analysis:
Top of aft cargo door matches other ruptured open cargo doors in flight, such as United Airlines Flight 811 and Pan Am Flight 103, in having vertical tear lines at aft and forward leading edge of the cargo door, missing pressure relief doors, longitudinal split about one third down from top and intact hinge and door attached to top fuselage skin.

Bottom of door with its attachment to sill and locked latches (if confirmed) matches Trans World Airlines Flight 800.
Conclusion: Can not yet rule in or rule out the shorted wiring/aft cargo door rupture/rapid decompression/inflight breakup explanation explanation for China Airlines Flight 611. Need more evidence, such as the actual middle parts with its latching hardware, before determination can be made.

JBS>For Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

From AAR 00/03 for Trans World Airlines Flight 800:
1.12.4 Engines ÔNo evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines."
The engine obviously came apart in the air throwing the broken from FOD blades everywhere including the right horizontal stabilizer just aft of number three, there is nothing ÔsoftÕ inside the engine so the Ôsoft body impactsÕ came from without, and sooting means abnormal fire inside the engine.

To say ÔNo evidence of uncontainment, case rupture, fire, penetration of an object from outside into the engine, or preimpact damage was found in any of the engines.Õ is as close to a lie as NTSB can come and still not be laughed out of the room.

But then, having one engine have FOD and the others not would conflict with the center tank as initial event explanation. Because, how could engine three have FOD and the others not? They were four huge vacuum cleaners up three nearby a mystery explosion. To say they had nothing negates the whole explosion explanation, especially a center tank explosion while engines at full climb power.

That stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 will always be there and it will always mean uncontainment of engine three and that will always mean ruptured open nearby cargo door inflight.

And all the opinions of Loeb and Wildey will not change the location or discovery of that stator blade directly aft of engine three.

Regardless, an explanation is needed for the two rupture holes at the midspans of the forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800. An honest person would say the center fuel tank explosion blew it open. But they never do. Except one guy, Neil
Schalekamp of FAA who quickly recanted and stated the NTSB point of view:

Manager in the Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, dated 30 January 98. Neil Schalekamp:

"While no one scenario has been categorically proven to the the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."

JBS>Shortly thereafter, nine days later, he changed his tune after I emailed his response to NTSB: Note his suddenly changed attitude.

NS>"It appears that you are determined to impose your theory about the events that led to this unfortunate accident upon the official investigators."

"Please take note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquires about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

"The evidence from the reconstructed 747 airplane reveals that the forward cargo door was attached to the forward section of the airplane and was latched in the closed position when this section
of the airplane impacted the ocean."
JBS>Well, an honest man even if only for a few days.

Ken Smart, the current head of AAIB, has said about Pan Am Flight 103,

X-From_: ksmart@aaib.gov.uk Thu Apr 18 09:41:49 2002
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2002 17:41:27 +0100
To: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
From: Ken Smart <ksmart@aaib.gov.uk>
Subject: Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message!
Cc: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>

Dear Mr Smith

Thank you for your hypothesis on the immediate cause of the PanAm 103.

During the first five days of the investigation into PanAm 103 the AAIB were pursuing two general lines of inquiry. The first was that the aircraft had suffered a structural failure in-flight as a result of a defect or induced structural overload, the second was that an improvised explosive devise was responsible.

When the evidence of an improvised explosive device was found, the investigation nevertheless concentrated on discovering whether there was any evidence that a structural weakness had been exploited. In that respect the fwd. cargo door was the subject of very detailed examination. All the specialists involved were satisfied that the fwd. cargo door was correctly latched when the device detonated and that the subsequent structural failures where secondary events.
All structures by nature of their design have paths of least resistance when subjected to abnormal loading. The structure in the vicinity of large strengthened apertures such as the fwd. cargo door provide very good examples of this. The window belt on pressurised aircraft provides another and similar example. You should not be surprised to find similar patterns of breakup in structural failures that emanate from very different causes. The important differences lie in the detailed examination rather than the macro features.

I'm sorry to be the one to pour cold water on your hypothesis, but the scenario that you suggest was the subject of very considerable examination in the early stages of the Lockerbie investigation.

Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Air Accidents

JBS>I evaluated this letter at length and responded to him pointing out that essentially he said the cargo door structural failure occurred in flight but was secondary. I then argued that the only difference of opinion we had was ÔwhenÔ it occurred. I pointed out the at initial event time the large hole where the forward cargo door used to be appeared as well as the 20 inch shatter hole on the port side (According to AAIB report itself). So, by the evidence, holes on both side of nose occurred at the same time. He never replied, most bomb guys never do when confronted with the evidence. Note how quick the AAIB rushed to judgment, five days. The NTSB narrative has the ÔgoÔ team thinking bomb before they took off from Andrews AFB that same night of the event.

KS>'All the specialists involved were satisfied that the fwd.
cargo door was correctly latched when the device detonated and that the subsequent structural failures were secondary events.'

JBS> Another assumption that once assumed, it's bomb forever. 'When the device detonated...' It's like assuming from day one that JFK was killed by two or more people and then all the conspiracy 'facts' make sense. It's a false initial premise.

Dear FAA, it's never too late to pursue safety related items when presented to you with evidence:
shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for early model Boeing 747s.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith  
(831) 659 3552  
541 Country Club Drive,  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
www.corazon.com  
barry@corazon.com

The Federal Aviation Administration (news - web sites)’s emergency order stressed that no serious incidents have been linked to problems with the pumps, which are made by Hydro-Aire Inc. of Burbank, Calif., and were installed in January and April on Boeing 737s, 747s and 757s.

The airlines were given four days to inspect their fleets. The FAA estimated 1,250 pumps could have a problem with wires that
were placed too close to a rotor and can chafe. Since one plane can have several pumps, it was not immediately clear how many aircraft might have the flaw.

Ron Wojnar, the FAA's deputy director of aircraft certification services, said any airlines that installed Hydro-Aire's pumps in the Boeing models since January are being ordered to keep enough fuel in the tanks to cover the devices even when the planes bank or encounter turbulence in flight.

"This is not an unsafe condition," he said, explaining that the submersion would prevent any sparks from igniting fuel vapors.

The FAA's inspection order affects 515 of the 737s, 247 of the 747s, and 678 of the 757s operated by U.S. carriers.

Foreign airlines operate about 2,100 of the jets. The FAA is sending advisories about the pumps to its counterpart agencies in those countries.

The FAA will issue a follow-up directive in a few weeks, instructing carriers to repair or replace any faulty pumps, Wojnar said.

The pumps are located in the center fuel tank under the fuselage. Some planes may also have pumps in wing tanks.

Boeing spokeswoman Liz Veridier said her company sent the airlines a bulletin Wednesday ordering the pumps replaced on 116 new planes that had been put into use this year.

Greg Ward, president of Hydro-Aire, said the problem appears to have occurred while the pumps were being assembled. Hydro-
Aire, meanwhile, has X-rayed all of the pumps that had not yet been shipped to Boeing about 150 pumps and found about 3 percent contained the wiring problem, Ward said.

He said one pump that the company took apart after it was returned by an airline contained a wire that had been rubbed by a nearby rotor, creating concern of a potential spark.

"When you have fuel covering the pump there's no oxygen, so there can be no fire," he said.

Other 737s, 747s and 757s were ordered to fly only with their tanks full enough to cover the pumps until further inspections could be carried out, said Boeing's Veridier.

The problem was detected on three planes that had pumps short out and stop working, giving the crew an indication of low pressure in the tank, said FAA spokesman Les Dorr.

The British carrier easyJet sent the pump back to Hydro-Aire on Aug. 12 after the crew of one of its Boeing 737s detected low pressure, Dorr said. A week later, a Northwest Airlines 747-400 reported a low pressure indication and found the same problem, he said. A China Southern Airlines 747-400 experienced the same trouble.

The National Transportation Safety Board (news - web sites) ruled that an explosion in the center fuel tank of TWA Flight 800 caused it to crash off the coast of Long Island in 1996. It said vapors in the partly empty tank probably were ignited by a spark in wiring.

The Paris-bound Boeing 747 exploded in a fireball at 13,700 feet, minutes after leaving John F. Kennedy International Airport. All
230 people on board were killed. "All of our pumps that were on Flight 800 were recovered and not found to be contributors to the crash," Ward said.

Saturday, 31 August, 2002, 12:02 GMT 13:02 UK
Q & A: Faulty fuel pumps

Airlines around the world are examining about 3,000 Boeing planes after being told of a potentially dangerous fault in a batch of fuel pumps.

Jane's Defence aviation security expert Chris Yates explains the problem.

Q: How frequently are safety warnings like this issued?
A: Fairly regularly.

Q: Then is this problem with the fuel pumps particularly significant?
A: It is potentially a major problem, because it affects the fuel tank.

Q: What is wrong with the fuel pumps?
A: The problem is that in the manufacture of these pumps the wiring has been placed too close to moving parts.

Q: What could happen?
A: The fear is those moving parts will in some way chap the wiring, which could cause an explosion.
Q: What is being done to protect passengers?

A: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) wants to find out in the next four days where these devices are, if they are on aircraft and if so, how many they are on.

Q: How widespread could it be?

A: It looks very much as though we are going to have a global issue here.

Q: Are all Boeings at risk?

A: Right across the board - Boeing 737s, 747s and 757s.

Q: How many are in the United States?

A: The FAA has called for 1,400 or so aircraft to be inspected in the United States.

Q: Is that the majority?

A: I have seen suggestions that there are slightly more than that flying elsewhere in the world. There are an awful lot of operators out there.

Q: What will happen if the faulty fuel pumps are located?

A: They will eventually be removed - but it will not be possible to do it immediately.

Q: What will happen while they are awaiting removal?
A: Every pilot needs to be told that if they have that particular part they must maintain sufficient fuel in the tanks to keep the pumps submerged.

Q: How will that help?
A: If the wiring does become frayed and chapped and there is a short-circuit, it would not cause an explosion because it would be immersed in liquid.

Carriers inspecting 1,440 Boeing jets for faulty fuel pumps

By LAURIE KELLMAN Associated Press Writer
Published 2:40 a.m. PDT Saturday, August 31, 2002
WASHINGTON (AP) - U.S.-based airlines are inspecting 1,400 Boeing jets to determine if they have a potentially faulty fuel pump that could cause an explosion.
In an emergency order issued Friday, the Federal Aviation Administration stressed that no serious incidents have been linked to problems with the pumps, which are made by Hydro-Aire Inc. of Burbank, Calif., and installed since January on Boeing 737s, 747s and 757s.
The government gave the airlines four days to inspect their fleets and was advising its counterpart agencies in other countries of the potential flaw.
The FAA estimated that 1,250 pumps could have a problem with wires that were placed too close to a rotor and can chafe. Since one plane can have several pumps, it was not immediately clear how many aircraft might have the flaw.
Ron Wojnar, the FAA's deputy director of aircraft certification services, said any airlines that installed Hydro-Aire's pumps in
the Boeing models since January are being ordered to keep enough fuel in the tanks to cover the devices even when the planes bank or encounter turbulence in flight. "This is not an unsafe condition," he said, explaining that the submersion would prevent any sparks from igniting fuel vapors. The FAA's inspection order affects 515 of the 737s, 247 of the 747s, and 678 of the 757s operated by U.S. carriers. Foreign airlines operate about 2,100 of the jets. The FAA will issue a follow-up directive in a few weeks, instructing carriers to repair or replace any faulty pumps, Wojnar said. The pumps are located in the center fuel tank under the fuselage. Some planes may also have pumps in wing tanks. Boeing spokeswoman Liz Veridier said the company sent the airlines a bulletin Wednesday ordering the pumps replaced on 116 new planes that had been put into use this year. Greg Ward, president of Hydro-Aire, said the problem appears to have occurred while the pumps were being assembled. The company, meanwhile, has X-rayed the approximately 150 pumps that had not yet been shipped to Boeing and found about 3 percent contained the wiring problem, Ward said. He said one pump that the company took apart after it was returned by an airline contained a wire that had been rubbed by a nearby rotor, creating concern of a potential spark. "When you have fuel covering the pump there's no oxygen, so there can be no fire," he said. Other 737s, 747s and 757s were ordered flown only with their tanks full enough to cover the pumps until further inspections could be carried out, said Boeing's Veridier. The problem was detected on three planes that had pumps short out and stop working, giving the crew an indication of low pressure in the tank, said FAA spokesman Les Dorr. The British carrier easyJet sent the pump back to Hydro-Aire on
Aug. 12 after the crew of one of its Boeing 737s detected low pressure, Dorr said. A week later, a Northwest Airlines 747-400 reported a low pressure indication and found the same problem, he said. A China Southern Airlines 747-400 experienced the same trouble.

The National Transportation Safety Board ruled that an explosion in the center fuel tank of TWA Flight 800 caused it to crash off the coast of Long Island, N.Y., in 1996. It said vapors in the partly empty tank probably were ignited by a spark in wiring.

Sep 1, 9:11 AM (ET)
By The Associated Press

A day after the government called for 1,400 Boeing jets to be inspected for possibly faulty fuel pumps, major U.S. carriers said Saturday they had few planes in which the pumps have been installed.

The directive from the Federal Aviation Administration said the pumps could cause an explosion because wires were placed too close to a rotor and could chafe.

American Airlines, the nation's No. 1 carrier, said Saturday it was replacing pumps on three aircraft. United and Delta, the nation's second- and third-largest airliners, said none of their planes was affected by the FAA order.

"We've checked our aircraft and spare parts inventory and we have none of the parts with the manufacturer or model number listed in the airworthiness directive," Delta spokeswoman Christi Tucker said.
Among smaller carriers, Northwest Airlines said about a half-dozen of its planes were affected by the order.

FAA spokesman William Shumann said it was not surprising airlines are finding few of the pumps in their planes. "These suspect pumps were only manufactured this year" and many probably are in airline inventories as spare parts, he said.

"Presumably airlines would just remove them from inventory, put them aside," he said. "An airline is not going to take a suspect pump from spare parts and put it on a plane."

The FAA stressed that no serious incidents have been linked to the pumps, which are supplied by Hydro-Aire Inc. of Burbank, Calif., and have been installed since January on Boeing 737s, 747s and 757s.

Boeing spokeswoman Liz Verdier said Saturday that the company delivered 118 jets this year with 1,300 of the possibly faulty pumps. The pumps are located in the center fuel tank under the fuselage. Some planes may also have pumps in wing tanks.

The FAA's order did not require airlines to immediately remove the pumps. Rather, airlines were ordered to keep enough fuel in the tanks to cover the devices even when the planes bank or encounter turbulence in flight.

Ron Wojnar, the FAA's deputy director of aircraft certification services, explained that submersion would prevent any sparks from igniting fuel vapors.

"This will enable carriers to continue flying as normal until the pumps are replaced," Verdier added.
Airlines were given four days to complete inspections.

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@qp6.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:11 AM PDT
To: Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov
Subject: Agusta A109A II, registration: N655GS

Dear Joe,

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 at 10:36 AM

My wife is a nurse, Corazon Luna Smith, and wanted to be an air ambulance nurse with the Air Force. So sorry about your cousin.

At 7:46 AM -0500 10/19/05, Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov wrote:
What my cousins family would like to know is what efforts were made to recover her body and how complete were efforts made to search for it.

Some contacts with the Navy and NTSB would be helpful.

DICKINA@ntsb.gov, WILDEYJ@ntsb.gov
Al Dickinson and Jim Wildey were at NTSB a few years ago and might be able to help.
john.brannen@ntsb.gov might help also.
Lyle.Streeter@faa.dot.gov was the NTSB liaison.
I am an independent aircraft accident investigator, primarily with early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups I attribute to the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation as explained on www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

I've included a previous accident in same type helo and all the SDRS on the type aircraft.

It appears with the scant data that it was a night VFR and pilot became disoriented and flew into water.....just a guess, need for data to rule in mechanical problems. No calls of problems to the ground and a helo could autorotate into water with survivors.

Good luck finding what you are looking for.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA, 93924
831 659 3552
barry@qp6.com

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?
ev_id=20051007X01599&key=1

NTSB Identification: SEA05MA202
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, September 29, 2005 in Edmonds, WA
Aircraft: Agusta A109A II, registration: N655GS
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
On September 29, 2005, about 2113 Pacific daylight time, an Agusta A109A II helicopter, N655GS, impacted the ocean waters of Puget Sound near Edmonds, Washington. The air ambulance helicopter was destroyed and the three occupants, an airline transport pilot and two flight nurses, were killed. The helicopter was operated by CJ Systems Aviation Group of West Mifflin, Pennsylvania, under contract to Airlift Northwest of Seattle, Washington. The helicopter was on a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight when the accident occurred. The flight departed from Harborview Medical Center in Seattle about 2104 with an intended destination of Arlington Municipal Airport (AWO) in Arlington, Washington. Earlier in the evening, the helicopter had flown a patient from a hospital in Arlington to Harborview. The accident occurred as the helicopter was returning to its base at AWO. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the helicopter's departure from Harborview, and a company flight plan was filed.

Radar data shows the helicopter departing Harborview, proceeding northbound over the water, following the coastline at an altitude of approximately 800 ft msl. As the radar track reaches an area near Edmonds called Brown's Bay, the helicopter appears to be turning towards the west, away from the shoreline. The last radar return places the helicopter at N 47:51.250 and W 122:21.520.

No eye witnesses to the accident have been located. A number of ear witnesses heard a low flying helicopter and then an
"explosion" or loud boom. About 2122, the communications center for Northwest Airlift attempted to contact the helicopter by radio as there was another mission for the helicopter. The communications center received no response from the helicopter.

A search was started, and the United States Coast Guard found debris floating in the water at N 47 51.190 and W 122 21.010 about 0130 on September 30, 2005. The largest piece of debris recovered was a section of the cabin floor. Numerous smaller pieces were also recovered. However, the majority of the helicopter, including both engines, transmission, main rotor head, tail boom and tail rotor, were not recovered. According to the USCG, the water depth in the area of the last radar return is approximately 580 feet. As of October 4, 2005, a representative of the helicopter's owner is making arrangements to attempt to locate and recover the wreckage.

http://www.airport-data.com/aircraft/N655GS.html

**Aircraft N655GS Profile**

1984 Agusta Spa A109A II

All Aircrafts Made By Agusta Spa   All Aircrafts in United States   Home

N655GS

Have a photo of this aircraft? Share with others.
Submit data or post comment of this aircraft

**Aircraft (FAA)**

*Manufacturer:*
Agusta Spa

*Model:*
A109A II

*Year built:*
1984
Serial Number (C/N): 7299
Mode S Code: 52117764
Aircraft Type: Rotorcraft
Amateur-Built: No
Number of Seats: 8
Number of Engines: 2
Engine Type: Turbo-shaft
Engine Manufacturer and Model: Allison 250-C20 SER
Owner (FAA)
Registration Type: Corporation
Owner: Ameritech Credit Corp Dba
Address: 2000 W Ameritech Center Dr Location 4c35f Hoffman Estates, IL 60196 US
Region: Great Lakes
Top
Status (FAA)
Certification Class: Standard
Certification Issued: 2003-05-23
Air Worthiness Test: 1993-04-28
At 7:46 AM -0500 10/19/05, Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov wrote:

John:

I'm interested in helping to alleviate some uncertainties in my cousins family. My cousin Lois was killed recently in a medivac helicopter accident in Seattle, on Sept 29, 05. The Airlift Northwest helicopter lost contact with its base about 9:15 pm, Sept 29. Wreckage was recovered in the Browns Bay area near Edmonds, WA.

Shortly after, local police agencies determined that the craft had sunk in an area too deep for their equipment to find and recover any of the craft. The Navy was asked to help in the recovery effort. The Navy was able to recover some of the craft however, all the craft was not recovered and Lois' body was never found. The recovery efforts were called off last week.

What my cousins family would like to know is what efforts were made to recover her body and how complete were efforts made to search for it.

They are not interested in pursuing any legal prosecution against anyone, only seeking this information for their own peace of mind.

I don't know how you might be able to help, since I found your email address while surfing the NTSB site. Can you help point us in the right direction? Some contacts with the Navy and NTSB would be helpful.
On December 1, 1994, about 1007 central standard time, an Agusta SPA A109A II, N1QF, operated by Metro Aviation, Inc., was destroyed when it collided with the terrain near Ann Arbor, Michigan. The commercial pilot and two passengers (medical evacuation crew members) were fatally injured. The 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight departed the St. Joseph Hospital in visual meteorological conditions about 1003, en route to Howell, Michigan. The purpose of the flight was to pick up a patient at Howell, and return to St. Joseph's Hospital.

Prior to the morning of the accident N1QF was designated as the standby helicopter; however, the primary helicopter was scheduled for maintenance on the day of the accident, therefore essential equipment had to be moved from the primary craft to N1QF. Before the transfer could be accomplished, N1QF was required to prepare for dispatch on the accident flight. What was later described by a witness as a "hasty dispatch," necessitated a hurried departure to accomplish the transfer of equipment, complete a preflight, and other items necessary for a medical evacuation flight. The witness to the departure stated that a complete preflight was accomplished by the crew; although this witness did not actually have an opportunity to watch the entire preparation. The witness indicated that the start of the engines was "normal," with no delay in the engine start up. The flight
departed at 1003.

At 1005 N1QF contacted the Ann Arbor, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Control Tower (ATCT), giving its position as one and one half miles east of St. Joseph's Hospital and requesting landing permission stating, in part, "I'd like to proceed inbound.. single engine landing, please." Six seconds later the flight was cleared into the class D surface area. Seven seconds later, N1QF responded stating, "Ah, disregard, I'm going down at this time." No additional information was transmitted, nor was the reason for the single engine landing stated. The pilot did not declare an emergency nor did he request assistance.

The pilot then contacted the dispatcher, at St. Joseph's Hospital and stated that he was going to land, "north of the university." The dispatcher requested the information be repeated and the pilot did so. There was no indication of any need for assistance, the nature of any emergency situation, nor was there any discussion of difficulties being experienced by the flight. Twenty-six seconds after the pilot's repeating the location to the dispatcher, he made a final transmission, indicating a crash was imminent.

Eyewitnesses observed the accident helicopter during the final few seconds of the flight. Two witnesses stated that the helicopter was trailing smoke from the area of the engines. One witness indicted that the helicopter was maneuvering just prior to the impact and that during the final descent which he described as "dropped like a stone," it appeared the rotor blades were "not turning hardly at all." Witnesses reported that the helicopter was nearly silent just prior to ground impact and that there was no engine noise at all after impact.
OTHER DAMAGE

One small tree was damaged during the impact with the terrain.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

The pilot was born May 27, 1952, and was the holder of a commercial helicopter certificate number 2157108, with instrument helicopter privileges. At the time of the accident he had 5,000 hours flight time, with 3,500 hours of pilot in command time and 300 hours in the make and model of helicopter involved in the accident. He held a second class medical certificate issued June 9, 1994. His most recent biennial flight review was accomplished in an Agusta A109 on October 23, 1994.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The helicopter was an Agusta SPA A109A II, serial number 7311, N1QF. The helicopter was maintained on an Approved Inspection Program. The most recent inspection occurred on June 13, 1994, with a total time in service of 1,870 hours. The helicopter had accumulated 57 hours since the inspection, at the time of the accident. The helicopter was last fueled on November 22, 1994.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The helicopter impacted flat terrain in a commercial area, on a northeast heading. Ground scars and eyewitness reports indicated that the helicopter impacted in a near vertical direction with little forward motion. The landing gear was found in the extended (gear down) position. The helicopter was lying on its left side.
The fuselage was crushed to about one-half the original height. The tail boom was partially separated from the fuselage from ground impact and impact with a small tree. Three of the main rotor blades were intact with little bending. The tail rotor assembly had impact damage only with no rotational damage evident. The main rotor head exhibited marks and damage consistent with blade coning impact.

The rotor system was inspected during the on scene phase of the investigation including the main and tail rotors, transmission and gearbox. No discrepancies were noted.

Both engines and the transmission exhibited little impact damage and were removed for further study. During the on-scene investigation both engines rotated and there was continuity throughout the gear train. No damage was visible in the output drive shafts on either engine. The fuel control pointer on the number 1 engine was at 30 degrees with the throttle handle at idle. The fuel control pointer on the number 2 engine was at 85 degrees with the throttle handle about mid-range. Fuel vacuum checks were done with engine number 1 having no leaks and engine number 2 having a leak traced to the fuel pump assembly.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A post mortem examination of the pilot was conducted by the Washtenaw County (Michigan) Medical Examiner, on December 2, 1994. No contributing pre-existing pathology was found.

A toxicological examination of specimens from the pilot proved negative for those drugs screen.

TESTS AND RESEARCH
Fuel samples from the fueling source were found to be free of water and within limits for Jet-A1.

Fuel and oil samples from the helicopter were tested at the Allison lab and were found to be within limits for Jet-A1 fuel and MIL-L-23699E oil.


Both engines were test run at Allison on a production test stand on January 11, 1995. Number 1 engine was found to be within limits. Number 2 engine experienced excessive compressor vibration, therefore, the control components from that engine were tested on the number 1 engine which had been successfully run. The engine operation did not reach the limits falling about 2% below top limits.

The compressor for engine number 2 was disassembled and inspected. A visual inspection revealed unusual balance marks. The rotor was check balanced and it measured at 0.006 oz-in of unbalance. The limit should have been 0.001 oz-in. Although the exact mode of unbalance was not determined, experienced sources indicated that the unusual marks could not be associated with normal operation of the engine; however could be associated with impact artifact.

The individual components (originally) from engine number 2 were tested on October 11, 1995, and the fuel control was found to fall about 2% below the top limit. There was nothing found
that would have prevented the engine from operating normally at the cruise setting.

Throughout the on-scene investigation and during the testing of components, nothing was found to indicate any reason that an engine should stop running inflight. Nothing was found in either engine to indicate an indication necessitating a need to manually shut down an engine inflight.

ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION

Parties to the investigation were the FAA Flight Standards District Office, Belleville, Michigan; Agusta Aerospace Corporation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Allison, Indianapolis, Indiana; Allied Signal Aerospace, South Bend, Indiana; and Metro Aviation Inc., Shreveport, Louisiana.

The helicopter wreckage was released to representatives of the owner on December 16, and December 22, 1994 and January 9, 1996.

Use your browsers 'back' function to return to synopsis

http://egl.natca.org/Board1102.htm

http://egl.natca.org/Nakanishi.htm
Service Difficulty Reports
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: TACH GENERATOR
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BULKHEAD
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BULKHEAD
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: STRUT
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: ICS SWITCH
AGUSTA A109A, Procedure: Other, Part: SERVO BASE
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: STRAP
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: STRAP
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: STRAP
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: STRAP
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: RETAINING PIN
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: RETAINING PIN
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: RETAINING PIN
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: RETAINING PIN
AGUSTA A109A, Procedure: Other, Part: BRACE
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: TRANSCEIVER
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: INDICATOR
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: INDICATOR
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BLADE
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: PIN
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: PIN
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: GUIDE
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BEARING
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: ICS SWITCH
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BEARING
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BEARING
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: HOUSING
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: LINE
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: TUBE
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: LOWER LINK
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BOLT
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: UPPER LINK
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BEARING
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BEARING
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: SLEEVE
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: BOOT
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: PUMP
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: SCISSORS
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: SCISSORS
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: TUBE ASSY
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: TUBE ASSY
AGUSTA A109A2, Part: OIL TUBE
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: LINK
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: SWITCH
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: COUPLING
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: ADAPTER
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: BEARING
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: RETAIN RING
AGUSTA A109A2, Air Carrier, Part: BEARING
AGUSTA A109A2, Personal Business, Part: LONGERON

AGUSTA A109A, Personal Business, Part: SERVO
AGUSTA A109A2, Personal Business, Part: SPAR
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: ELEVATOR
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: ELEVATOR
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: ATTACH FITTING
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: BULKHEAD
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: RIB
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: RIB
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: BRACE
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: BOLT
AGUSTA A109A2, General Aviation, Part: NOZZLE
From: John Barry Smith <barry@qp6.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:11 AM PDT
To: Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov
Subject: Another recent Agusta 109 positioning crash.

NTSB Identification: NYC06MA005
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, October 07, 2005 in Smethport, PA
Aircraft: Augusta 109E, registration: N7YL
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On October 7, 2005, at 2342 eastern daylight time, an Augusta 109E, N7YL, operated by CJ Systems Incorporated, was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain in Smethport, Pennsylvania, while performing an instrument approach to Bradford Regional Airport (BFD), Bradford, Pennsylvania. The certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight that originated from Kane Community Hospital (PA91), Kane,
Pennsylvania, at 2324. The positioning flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

In an interview, a mission flight nurse stated that he and another nurse were onboard the helicopter during a positioning flight from their base in Harborcreek, Pennsylvania, to Kane Community Hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, he and the other nurse deplaned to prepare a patient for transport to Pittsburgh, while the helicopter departed for Bradford Airport to refuel.

An examination of preliminary radar and voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the helicopter departed the Kane Hospital helipad and the pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC), at 2324:47. He stated that he had departed the hospital, and was "VFR to uh Bradford three thousand two hundred climbing to five."

Over the next 4 minutes, the pilot requested the instrument landing system (ILS Runway 32) approach to Bradford Regional Airport, and he and the controller discussed whether the helicopter would be vectored to the final approach course or if the full approach procedure would be flown.

At 1128:12, the controller stated, "say your heading I've got you heading the wrong way for Bradford."

Pilot: "seven yankee Lima currently two four six on the heading."

Controller: "and you're heading to Bradford B-F-D, Bradford, P-A?"

Pilot: "affirmative."
Controller: "why don't we fly heading zero four zero for Bradford please"

The pilot acknowledged the instructions; the helicopter then reversed direction, and assumed a northeasterly track. About three minutes later, the controller stated, "fly heading of zero eight five radar vectors runway three two I-L-S"

The pilot acknowledged the radio call, and the helicopter assumed an easterly track.

At 1139:01, the controller stated, "seven yankee lima fly heading of three four zero join the localizer report established please." At that time, the helicopter was at 5,100 feet, on an easterly track, about 1 mile west of the runway extended centerline. The pilot acknowledged the instructions.

The radar track depicted the helicopter on an easterly heading as it flew through the 322-degree final approach course, about 4 miles from the outer marker.

At 1140:03, the controller stated, "I've got you on the right side of the I-L-S"

Pilot: "(unintelligible) I should be able to rejoin"

Controller: "descend and maintain four thousand feet"

Pilot: "out of five for four."

Controller: "are you established on the I-L-S"
Pilot: "recapturing"

Controller: "you say affirmative"

Pilot: "affirmative"

Controller: "lifeguard seven yankee lima roger cleared I-L-S three two uh runway at Bradford uh maintain four thousand and uh report cancellation on this frequencyÉ"

The pilot acknowledged the instructions.

At the time the controller advised that the helicopter was right of the localizer course, the radar track depicted the helicopter about midway through a left turn to about a 310-degree heading, at 5,100 feet, and about 1 mile east of the runway centerline.

The helicopter's track approached the runway centerline, and then turned sharply away from, and to the right of the inbound course. The track showed an approximate heading of 100 degrees, when the radar target disappeared.

The last radar plot was approximately over the crash site at 4,300 feet mean sea level, about 1 mile east of the extended runway centerline, and 4 miles from the airport.

In an interview, a witness that lived approximately one mile from the crash site said that he did not see the helicopter, but heard it pass overhead. He said that he was familiar with the sound, as he had lived close to the final approach course for runway 32 for many years.

The witness said the sound was louder than usual, and he felt that
the helicopter was closer to his home and lower than usual. The witness described the sound as smooth and continuous, with no change in aircraft noise. After the helicopter over flew his position, he heard the sound of an explosion.

On October 8, 2005, the FAA generated an alert notice at 0101, and a ground search for the helicopter began in the early morning hours of October 8, 2005. A search by air was not conducted due to weather. The helicopter wreckage was found on October 9, 2005, and was examined at the site on October 10, 2005.

The helicopter impacted heavily wooded terrain, and all major components were accounted for at the scene. The initial impact point was in a treetop about 50 feet above the ground on level terrain. The wreckage path was about 180 feet long, and oriented about 100 degrees. The helicopter was fragmented, burned, and melted along the entire path. There were several pieces of angularly cut wood along the wreckage path, and several trees with fire damage, and long angular slices along their trunks.

The wreckage path was documented at 1-foot increments called wreckage points (WP). At WP 33, a large tree, about 15 inches in diameter, was broken off about 25 feet above the ground. Sheets of composite material were embedded vertically into the trunk fracture.

The vertical fin was at WP 41. The tailboom was abeam the vertical fin, about 30 feet right of the wreckage path centerline. Structure that contained the number 1 hanger bearing was also at WP 41, 25 feet left of centerline.

The main wreckage, which consisted mostly of the main transmission, with mast and rotor head attached, was entangled at
the base of three trees at WP 66. The cockpit and cabin area were consumed by fire. All instruments and gauges associated with the cockpit were destroyed by impact and post crash fire.

Control continuity could not be established. All flight controls, tubes, and bellcranks that were examined displayed impact damage and failures consistent with overload.

All four rotor blades were located at the site. They were extensively damaged by impact and fire. The red, white, and yellow blade grips were still attached to the head. The blue blade grip, with damper attached, was located about 12 feet to the right of the transmission and rotor head.

All four main rotor blade spars were exposed, with the associated composite and honeycomb material scattered along the wreckage path.

Examination of the rotor head revealed that the red and white pitch change links were still attached to their hubs and the swashplate. The pitch change link for the yellow blade was broken at the swashplate, and the blue pitch change link was broken at the grip. All fractures appeared to be consistent with overload.

The red, white, and yellow dampers were still attached to the head, but separated from their respective grips. The blue main rotor blade damper was separated from the rotor head, but still attached to its grip.

The engines were entangled in aircraft structure at WP 75, and both were extensively damaged by fire. The number one engine was broken open, with internal components scattered on the
ground. The number 2 engine was largely intact.

Continuity of the powertrain could not be established. The combining gearbox was fractured into several pieces, and the oil cooler impeller was exposed. All drive couplings and driveshafts showed fracture surfaces that were consistent with impact and torsional overload.

A section of tree trunk, about six feet long and consistent with the fractured tree at WP 33, was found 180 feet beyond the initial point of impact. The trunk section was about 15 inches in diameter. The bark and wood along one side was shaved clean and displayed angular slices. There was aircraft structural sheet metal and associated hardware embedded in the wood.

The helicopter was manufactured in 2001, and had accrued 1,905 total airframe hours. It was maintained under an Approved Aircraft Inspection Program (AAIP), and its most recent inspection was completed August 5, 2005.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft helicopter and instrument helicopter. His most recent FAA second class medical certificate was issued on October 19, 2004, and he reported 9,616 hours of total flight experience on that date.

The pilot's logbook was not recovered, however, some flight times were extracted from company records. In the 90 days prior to the accident, the pilot logged 56 hours of total time, all of which was in the Augusta 109E. He logged 25 hours of flight experience at night, 3 hours of simulated instrument experience, and 3 hours of actual instrument flight experience.
The company reported that the pilot had 110 total hours of instrument flight experience, 70 hours of simulated instrument flight experience, and 40 hours of actual instrument flight experience.

At 2337, the weather reported at Bradford Regional Airport included an overcast ceiling at 600 feet, with 2 1/2 miles of visibility in mist. The temperature was 50 degrees Fahrenheit and the dew point was 48 degrees Fahrenheit.

NTSB Identification: SEA05MA202
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, September 29, 2005 in Edmonds, WA
Aircraft: Agusta A109A II, registration: N655GS
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On September 29, 2005, about 2113 Pacific daylight time, an Agusta A109A II helicopter, N655GS, impacted the ocean waters of Puget Sound near Edmonds, Washington. The air ambulance helicopter was destroyed and the three occupants, an airline transport pilot and two flight nurses, were killed. The helicopter was operated by CJ Systems Aviation Group of West Mifflin, Pennsylvania, under contract to Airlift Northwest of Seattle, Washington. The helicopter was on a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight when the accident occurred. The flight departed from Harborview Medical Center in Seattle about 2104 with an intended destination of Arlington Municipal Airport (AWO) in Arlington, Washington. Earlier in the evening, the helicopter had
flown a patient from a hospital in Arlington to Harborview. The accident occurred as the helicopter was returning to its base at AWO. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the helicopter's departure from Harborview, and a company flight plan was filed.

Radar data shows the helicopter departing Harborview, proceeding northbound over the water, following the coastline at an altitude of approximately 800 ft msl. As the radar track reaches an area near Edmonds called Brown's Bay, the helicopter appears to be turning towards the west, away from the shoreline. The last radar return places the helicopter at N 47:51.250 and W 122:21.520.

No eye witnesses to the accident have been located. A number of ear witnesses heard a low flying helicopter and then an "explosion" or loud boom. About 2122, the communications center for Northwest Airlift attempted to contact the helicopter by radio as there was another mission for the helicopter. The communications center received no response from the helicopter.

A search was started, and the United States Coast Guard found debris floating in the water at N 47 51.190 and W 122 21.010 about 0130 on September 30, 2005. The largest piece of debris recovered was a section of the cabin floor. Numerous smaller pieces were also recovered. However, the majority of the helicopter, including both engines, transmission, main rotor head, tail boom and tail rotor, were not recovered. According to the USCG, the water depth in the area of the last radar return is approximately 580 feet. As of October 4, 2005, a representative of the helicopter's owner is making arrangements to attempt to locate and recover the wreckage.
I'm interested in helping to alleviate some uncertainties in my cousins family. My cousin Lois was killed recently in a medivac helicopter accident in Seattle, on Sept 29, 05. The Airlift Northwest helicopter lost contact with its base about 9:15 pm, Sept 29. Wreckage was recovered in the Browns Bay area near Edmonds, WA.

Shortly after, local police agencies determined that the craft had sunk in an area too deep for their equipment to find and recover any of the craft. The Navy was asked to help in the recovery effort. The Navy was able to recover some of the craft however, all the craft was not recovered and Lois' body was never found. The recovery efforts were called off last week.

What my cousins family would like to know is what efforts were made to recover her body and how complete were efforts made to search for it.

They are not interested in pursuing any legal prosecution against anyone, only seeking this information for their own peace of mind.

I don't know how you might be able to help, since I found your email address while surfing the NTSB site. Can you help point us in the right direction? Some contacts with the Navy and NTSB would be helpful.

Thanks.
Joe Nakanishi
847-294-8461 Office

From: John Barry Smith <barry@qp6.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:11 AM PDT
To: Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov
Subject: Re: Another recent Agusta 109 positioning crash.

At 2:46 PM -0500 10/25/05, Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov wrote:

Does this indicate anything to you, the fact that there's been two accidents with this craft in a month?

Dear Joe, Tuesday, October 25, 2005 at 2:56 PM

Good question. It depends on the evidence. It seems pilot error was the primary cause but why? Maybe the pilots relax during positioning flights and complacency kills. Maybe overconfidence because it's a helo and can land anywhere.

I haven't done much helo accident research so can't say with any authority. There may be some confusion inherent in the instrument panel data which leads these pilots astray. Need much more evidence. The final NTSB report should be interesting.

What is wrong is flying in bad weather or night close to the ground in peacetime for positioning flights. Not necessary.

Regards,
Helicopter firm suffers second crash in month

By The Associated Press

TONI L. BAILEY / THE OLYMPIAN
Investigators inspect the wreckage of an Airlift Northwest helicopter that crashed late Friday while leaving Providence St. Peter Hospital in Olympia. No one was seriously hurt.

OLYMPIA Ñ Federal investigators were at Providence–St. Peter Hospital early Saturday, examining debris from the second crash in a month of an Airlift Northwest medical-evacuation helicopter.

None of the four people on board was seriously injured in the accident, which occurred on takeoff from the hospital roof late Friday. The previous crash, Sept. 29 near Edmonds, killed all three crew members.
One of the three crew members in Friday's accident was hospitalized overnight, hospital spokeswoman Deborah Shawyer said.

The fourth person in the aircraft was a patient who had been taken to Olympia from Grays Harbor County by ambulance for helicopter evacuation to Harborview Medical Center in Seattle.

Weather on the coast was too rough, so the pilot "wisely decided" to do the pickup in Olympia, said Michael Copass, medical director at Airlift Northwest. The patient had "a life-threatening vascular issue," he said.

The patient was not injured in the crash but was being treated at St. Peter hospital for the pre-existing problem and was unlikely to be moved now, Shawyer said.

The crash occurred immediately after liftoff. "On takeoff, the helicopter lost power and more or less fell off the building," landing between the hospital and an outbuilding, Copass said. There was some damage to the building.

The aircraft was one of two new $4.4 million Augusta A-109 helicopters purchased by Airlift Northwest, he said. "We'd just begun to upgrade the fleet."

"We were somewhat taken aback, and grounded the other one" until authorities determine the reason for Friday's crash, Copass said.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was on scene Friday night and again Saturday morning, when the National Transportation Safety Board took over the crash investigation, said FAA's Debbie Taylor in Auburn.

In the Sept. 29 crash, the helicopter was en route from
Seattle to its home base in Arlington when it plummeted into Puget Sound, killing pilot Steve Smith, 59, of Whidbey Island, and nurses Erin Reed, 48, and Lois Suzuki, 47, both of Seattle.

In September 1995, a similar Airlift Northwest accident off Bainbridge Island also claimed three lives.

The crash last month involved a helicopter that was 18 to 20 years old and not equipped with a night-vision system Ñ one of the upgrades in the chopper that went down Friday.

Airlift Northwest spokeswoman Mardie Rhodes said the company will bring in consultants to audit its operating procedures, a decision it made before Friday's crash.

Before the accident last month, Airlift Northwest operated six helicopters from four bases around the region. A replacement chopper was brought in shortly after that crash. But with Friday's accident and the idling of the second new helicopter, the company is down to four.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@qp6.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:11 AM PDT
To: Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov
Subject: NTSB air ambulance flights..

Approved-By: NTSBPressReleases@NTSB.GOV
Thread-Topic: NTSB Calls for Stricter Regulation of Air Ambulance Flights
Thread-Index: AcYh9Pd5EyKbdGSkTNyMrIJdHMfUdA==
X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA==
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2006 16:19:03 -0500
Reply-To: NTSB AVIATION LIST
<AVIATION@LISTSERV.NTSB.GOV>
NTSB PRESS RELEASE

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: January 25, 2006
SB-06-04

WASHINGTON, D.C. - In a special report adopted today, the National
Transportation Safety Board called for the Federal Aviation Administration to impose stricter requirements on all emergency medical services flights.


During the study the Board found that while carrying patients or organs, EMS flights are required to operate in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 regulations. However, when positioning flights are conducted without patients on board, they are permitted to operate under the much less stringent provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The Board noted that thirty-five of the fifty-five accidents occurred on positioning flights with medical crewmembers, but no patients, on board.

Part 135 and Part 91 requirements differ significantly regarding weather minimums and crew rest requirements -- two key factors found in the EMS
accidents investigated by the Board. The Board concluded that the safety of EMS operations would be improved if the entire EMS flight plan operated under Part 135 regulations and recommended that the FAA require all emergency medical services to comply with Part 135 regulations during the conduct of all flights with medical personnel on board.

The Board's investigation also examined the decision-making process of EMS operators when evaluating the potential risks of a flight. Weather, nighttime flight, spatial disorientation from the lack of visual clues, pilot training and experience, and pressure to take the flight are all risks associated with the EMS mission. Safely operating in this high-risk environment calls for the systematic evaluation and management of the risks. However the Board found that none of the operators involved in the highlighted accidents had an established aviation risk evaluation program at the time of the accident. Therefore the Board recommended that the FAA require EMS operators to develop and implement flight risk evaluation programs.

In conjunction with the lack of risk evaluation programs, the Board's investigation revealed that many EMS operators lack a consistent, comprehensive
flight dispatch procedure to assist pilots in determining the safety of a mission. Currently most EMS operators are notified of an assignment by the local 911-dispatch system or emergency hospital staff. Because most hospital staff and 911 dispatchers do not have aviation expertise, they are not aware of flight requirements, particularly requirements for nighttime flight or adverse conditions. This information is critical and can help avoid accidents. The Board asked the FAA to require EMS operators to use formalized dispatch and flight following procedures that include a dispatcher with aviation experience, up-to-date weather information, and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions.

Finally the report reviewed several technologies that can assist in flight operations - terrain awareness warning systems (TAWS) and night vision imaging systems (NVIS). Controlled flight into terrain is a common factor in helicopter EMS accidents that could be alleviated by the use of TAWS. The investigations of seventeen of the fifty-five accidents determined that TAWS might have helped pilots avoid terrain. The Board recommended that the FAA require the installation of terrain warning systems on all EMS aircraft.
In addition to TAWS, the Safety Board found that some EMS operators were using NVIS to enhance a pilot's ability to avoid terrain. The Board determined that if used properly, NVIS could help EMS pilots identify and avoid hazards during nighttime operations. However, because NVIS are not feasible in some situations such as populated areas with ambient light or numerous streetlights, the Board did not make a recommendation on this subject.

In its action today, the Board also adopted final reports for seven EMS accidents highlighted in the safety study. A synopsis of the report that includes the conclusions, and recommendations can be found on the Board's website, www.ntsb.gov. Briefs of the individual accidents, including probable cause statements, will be available on the website, on Friday, January 27.

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Media Contact: Lauren Peduzzi  
(202) 314-6100  
peduzzi@ntsb.gov
At 7:46 AM -0500 10/19/05, Joe.A.Nakanishi@faa.gov wrote:

John:

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